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Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay 
 




In protecting safety, health, and the environment, government has increasingly 
relied on cost-benefit analysis. In undertaking cost-benefit analysis, the government has 
monetized risks of death through the idea of “value of a statistical life” (VSL), currently 
assessed at about $6.1 million. Many analysts, however, have suggested that the 
government should rely instead on the “value of a statistical life year” (VSLY), in a way 
that would likely result in significantly lower benefits calculations for elderly people, and 
significantly higher benefits calculations for children. I urge that the government should 
indeed focus on statistical life-years rather than statistical lives. A program that saves 
young people produces more welfare than one that saves old people. Nor does a focus on 
life-years run afoul of ethical limits on cost-benefit analysis. It is relevant in this 
connection that every old person was once young, and that if all goes well, young people 
will eventually be old. In fact, a focus on statistical lives is a more plausibly a form of 
illicit discrimination than a focus on life-years, because the idea of statistical lives treats 
the years of older people as worth far more than the years of younger people. The hard 
question involves not whether to undertake this shift, but how to monetize life-years, and 
here willingness to pay (WTP), despite it many problems, is generally the place to begin. 
Discussion is also devoted to the uses and limits of the willingness to pay criterion in 
regulatory policy, with reference to the underlying welfare goal and to the nature of 




 In the last two decades, numerous regulatory agencies have conducted cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) of proposed rules.1 To undertake this analysis, they have had to 
quantify the value of a statistical life (VSL).2 Recently the range, for that value, has been 
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1 See Robert Hahn, Global Regulatory Reform (2001); W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1994). 
2 See id. 
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in the neighborhood of $6.1 million.3 But there is a conspicuous difficulty with the use of 
a uniform VSL. Some regulatory programs benefit people who are relatively young; 
others benefit people who relatively old. If a program would prevent fifty deaths of 
people who are twenty, should it be treated the same way as a program that would 
prevent fifty deaths of people who are seventy? Some people believe that other things 
being equal, a program that protects young people is better than one that protects old 
people,4 because it delivers greater benefits In their view, government should consider 
not simply the number of lives at stake, or the VSL; it should concern itself also or 
instead with the number of life-years, or the value of statistical life-years (VSLY). At the 
very least, VSLY is a more precise measure of what is at stake. 
 
  At least since 1976, analysts have suggested the possibility of focussing 
regulatory policy on either life-years or quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs).5 Through 
the latter measure, the issue is not merely the number of life-years saved by regulation; 
attention is also paid to qualitative improvements in health.6 An aggregate measure of 
QALYs would catalogue all of the health-related benefits of regulation. And for many 
years, some agencies have experimented with the idea that cost-benefit analysis should 
consider either QALYs or life-years, not merely the number of lives saved.7 For 
simplicity, my major focus here is on life-years, which imposes lower informational 
demands on regulators than do QALYs, and which is also less contentious in principle.8 
A moment’s reflection will show that VSLY can produce different results from VSL. If 
the beneficiaries of a regulation are mostly elderly people, then the regulation will seem 
far less attractive with the use of VSLY than with VSL.9 But if the beneficiaries are 
                                                 
3 See Robert Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
323, 334-35 (2001). For discussion of why these numbers might be too low, see Dora Costa and Matthew 
Kahn, The Rising Price of Nonmarket Goods, 93 American Economic Review 227, 229 (Papers and 
Proceedings) (2003) (suggesting a likely current value of $12 million) Richard Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COL L REV 941 (1999) 
(suggesting the need to inflate current figures for increases in social wealth and in the particular context of 
dreaded and involuntary risks); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L. J. 2255 (2002) 
(discussing plausible reasons to adjust current figures upwards); Dora L. Costa and Matthew Kahn, 
Changes in the Value of Life: 1940-1980 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=364740. For recent evidence that the current numbers are indeed too low, see W. Kip Viscusi, 
Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of A Statistical Life (2003), available on ssrn.com (finding 
values as high as $15.1 million in the case of white males). 
4 See, e.g., Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life, 26 Economic 
Inquiry 369 (1988). 
5 Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 
1976, at 5. 
6 Id. 
7 For examples, see Appendix. 
8 The reason is that in assessing life-years, government need not concern itself with issues of the quality of 
life. I offer a brief discussion of QALYs below. 
9 I am assuming a relatively uniform value, for each statistical life year, and hence assuming that the 
valuation of each of the remaining years of seniors is not going to be much higher than the valuation of 
each of the remaining years of younger people. If older people’s remaining years have a much higher 
valuation, the conclusion in the text does not follow. For discussion, see below. 
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mostly children, then a regulation is likely to seem far more attractive with VSLY than 
with VSL.10  
 
 The issue received a great deal of public attention in connection with recent 
debates within Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).11 EPA’s own assessment of the benefits of the Clean Air Act 
includes a calculation of VSLY, using two estimates, $270,000 (not discounted) and 
$166,000 (discounted at an annual rate of 3 percent).12 In its “Clear Skies” proposal, EPA 
estimated benefits both by using the $6.1 million figure and by using an alternative 
method that produced numbers of $3.7 million for those under 70 and $2.3 million for 
those 70 and older.13 The difference between $3.7 and $2.3 million triggered intense 
criticism of a “senior death discount.”14 Eventually EPA abandoned the idea of varying 
VSL on the basis of age,15 perhaps as a result of public pressure, and after the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) found methodological problems with the study that 
supported the age-adjustment analysis.16 But OMB has been strongly encouraging federal 
agencies, including the EPA, to consider VSLY,17 and OMB’s draft guidelines on cost-
benefit analysis ask agencies to “consider providing estimates of both VSL and VSLY.”18  
 
Thus OMB has urged that “agency analysts, when performing benefit-cost 
analysis, present results using both the VSL and the VSLY methods.”19 Relying on 
evidence that older people show unusually high VSLY, OMB also suggests “that 
agencies present analyses with larger VSLY estimates for senior citizens.”20 Building on 
                                                 
10 The same qualification is appropriate here as in note 9; if children’s life-years are valued in terms of 
WTP, and if their WTP is low, the statement in the text would not follow. 
11 For recent discussion, see Robert H. Hahn and Scott Wallsten, Is Granny Worth $2.3 Million or $6.1 
Million?, http://www.aei.brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=138 
12 See Environmental Protection Agency, Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 (1997). 
See the criticism of this approach in Environmental Protection Agency, Children’s Health Valuation 
Handbook 3-13 (2003), suggesting that “the relationship between the value of risk reductions and expected 
remaining life years is more complex than the simple discounted linear relationship . . . Current research 
does not provide a reliable method for estimating a value of a statistical life-year.” I explore this problem 
below. 
13 See id.; Environmental Protection Agency, Technical Addendum: Methodologies for the Benefit 
Analysis of the Clear Skies Initiatives 35-37 (2002), relying on M.W. Jones Lee et al., The Value of 
Preventing Non-Fatal Road Injuries; Findings of a Willingness-to-Pay National Sample Survey, TRY 
Working Paper, WP SRC2. 
14 See John Tierney, Life: The Cost-Benefit Analysis, section 4, p. 3, The New York Times, May 18, 2003. 
15 Id. 
16 See Memorandum of John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
Office of Management and Budget, to the President’s Management Council 1 (May 30, 2003). 
17 See id.; Dana Wilkie, White House Continues to Push For “Age” Discount In Rulemaking, Copley News 
Service (May 16, 2003), available at https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b9948ff37008fac2330 
e2ce6a66f5e57&docnum=4&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-lSlWk&_md5=aaa30b6f202f7 
e1e23717bc35a2806b1. 
18 See Office of Management and Budget, Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Federal Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 5521 (Feb. 3, 2003). 
19 See Memorandum of John Graham, supra note, at 2.  
20 Id. I raise questions about this recommendation below. In brief, older people might be willing to pay 
more for risk reduction than younger people, but the higher willingness to pay need not reveal a greater 
welfare gain from risk reduction.  
 4
existing studies, one proposal would value each year of life at $273,000 for people over 
65 but at $172,000 for people who are younger.21 Because the number of remaining years 
is a central part of the proposed calculus, a 65-year old, with a life expectancy of ten 
more years, would be valued at $2.7 million, whereas a 40-year old, with thirty-five years 
left, would be valued at $6 million. Thus regulations protecting people over forty would 
be worth less than they would under the $6.1 million benchmark, whereas those under 
forty would be worth more. A ten-year old, with sixty-five years left, would be valued at 
over $11 million.  
 
Would focussing on life-years make a large difference for policy? How much? 
The answers depend on what it means to focus on life-years. At first glance, a decision to 
look at VSLY is highly likely to reduce the expected benefits of programs that mostly 
help older people. This was the effect of a life-years calculation for the Clear Skies 
Initiative.22 A focus on VSLY is also likely to increase the expected benefits of programs 
that protect children and young people. The extent of the increase depends on value of the 
relevant life-years and the discount rate. Suppose that a uniform number is used for the 
remaining life-years of young people. With no discount rate, or a low discount rate, a 
program that protects such people will be far more valuable under VSLY than VSL. With 
a high discount rate, the difference between VSLY and VSL will be compressed, but it 
will still result in higher numbers for younger people. 
 
 My simplest claim in this essay is that in terms of welfare, it is fully appropriate 
to focus on life-years, not merely lives, and that both academic and public criticisms of 
the life-years approach are misconceived. The reasons for this conclusion are simple: No 
program literally “saves” lives; life-extension is always what is at issue. If the goal is to 
promote people’s welfare by lengthening their lives, a regulation that saves 500 life-years 
(and, let us say, twenty-five people) is, other things equal, better than a regulation that 
saves 50 life-years (also, let us say, twenty-five people). A program that saves younger 
people is better, along every dimension, than an otherwise identical program that saves 
older people23—a statement that seems controversial only if we see life as a snapshot in 
which people are frozen at their current points in the age distribution.  
 
Any defense of relying life-years has to come to terms with some equitable 
objections to what seems to be a form of age discrimination.24 A central goal here is to 
answer those objections. Hence I suggest not only that more life-years mean more 
                                                 
21 See Hahn and Wallsten, supra note. EPA’s current estimates are $170,000 for those under age 65 and 
$434,000 for those over age 65. See Memorandum of John Graham, supra note, at 2 note **. For a lifetime 
risk faced by someone who is now 40, it would be sensible to calculate each life year, before 65, at the 
lower rate, and to calculate each life year, after that age, at the higher rate, subject to the appropriate 
discount rate. OMB says, delicately, that “[m]ore research is needed to provide a complete picture of how 
VSLY varies over the lifespan.” Id. 
22 See supra note. 
23 The “other things being equal” proviso is important here. I put to one side the problem of transition, 
taken up below. Note also that a decision to shift from VSL to VSLY will be harmful to people who are 
now older and who did not benefit from earlier use of VSLY. 
24 See the overview in John McKie et al., The Allocation of Health Care Resources: An Ethical Evaluation 
of the QALY Approach 47-72 (1998). 
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welfare, other things being equal, but also that a focus on life-years does not offend 
ethical constraints on the pursuit of increased welfare through regulation.25 Of course it is 
tempting, and in a sense right, to urge that each life should count for no more and no less 
than one. On this view, a focus on life-years might be seen to violate the equality 
principle, because it treats elderly people as if they were worth less (literally) than 
younger people. This argument, I suggest, is rooted in a generally sound moral intuition: 
Sometimes the pursuit of welfare should be constrained by considerations of justice. It is 
at least imaginable, for example, that one hundred white people would receive more 
welfare from the elimination of a risk of 1/100,000 than would one hundred African-
Americans. But even if this is so, government should not create an “African-American 
death discount.”26 The reason is that the welfare difference—assuming that it exists—is 
at least partly a product of past and present injustice. By contrast, injustice is not the 
source of the welfare difference between the protection of one hundred children and the 
protection of one hundred elderly people. Because every old person was once young, an 
emphasis on life-years does not discriminate against anyone; the very people who lose, in 
a sense, when older also gained when younger. In fact the use of statistical lives, rather 
than life-years, is plausibly taken as a form of discrimination against younger people, 
because it treats each of their anticipated years as less valuable than those of older people. 
As I shall also show, an emphasis on life-years does not run afoul of the principles that 
animate the prohibition on age discrimination. My most modest suggestion, then, is that 
in producing regulatory impact analyses,27 agencies should do a sensitivity analysis in 
which they inquire into life-years as well as lives—and take account of that sensitivity 
analysis in deciding what to do.  
 
Even if we agree that life-years matter, there remains the separate and quite 
vexing question of how to turn them into monetary equivalents. For VSL, willingness-to-
pay (WTP) studies are used to produce the relevant values.28 Economists and 
economically oriented urge that CBA is properly based on WTP for the various benefits 
of regulation.29 Hence the real issue, an empirical one, is whether WTP varies over the 
life-cycle. If thirty-year-olds are willing to pay more (or less) to eliminate a statistical risk 
than sixty-year-olds, then the difference should be reflected in cost-benefit analyses of 
regulatory proposals. On this view, policymakers should use different values for old 
                                                 
25 Hence I am suggesting that for purposes of regulatory policy, the goal is to promote welfare, subject to 
justice-related constraints. It might be urged instead that here as elsewhere, justice is part of the social 
maxim and. I do not believe that these different approaches lead to different analysis of the issues I am 
discussing here. For a general discussion of welfare and fairness, see Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, 
Fairness vs. Welfare (2002). Because Kaplow and Shavell use a capacious understanding of welfare, one 
that includes distributional considerations, my identification of ethical (and in a sense fairness-related) 
constraints on the promotion of welfare through regulation is not at odds with their claims.  
26 The issue is complex if the beneficiaries of regulation must pay all of its social cost. Suppose, for 
example, that a program benefiting African-Americans would also impose costs, in the form (for example) 
of higher water bills. If so, and if the beneficiaries have full information, a lower VSLY, for them, might be 
justified in principle. Government does people no favors by requiring them to pay more than their WTP, at 
least if no information failure is involved. For discussion, see below. 
27 As required by Executive Order 12866, 3 CFR 638 (1993). 
28 See Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note. 
29 See, e.g., Anna Alberini et al., Does the Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age and Health Status? 
Evidence from the United States and Canada (unpublished manuscript 2002). 
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people and young people if and only if WTP studies show such a disparity.30 This view 
has been endorsed by the Office of Management and Budget itself.31 And indeed, WTP is 
the basis for current evaluations of regulatory benefits.32  
 
I do not attempt to engage the complex debate over WTP fully here. But I do urge 
that with respect to lives or life-years, the argument for relying on WTP is most secure in 
cases in which the beneficiaries of regulation have to pay all of its cost. So long as people 
have adequate information, government does them no favors by requiring them to 
purchase goods for which they are not willing to pay. When the beneficiaries of 
regulation do not pay its full cost, the argument for making WTP conclusive is less 
strong. Nonetheless, I urge that there is no special reason to depart from WTP if 
government is focussing on statistical life-years rather than statistical lives. My more 
ambitious suggestion, then, is that at least in general, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) should 
be conducted with primary attention to VSLY rather than VSL. If CBA is to be used at 
all, it is because CBA is a rough way of testing whether a regulation will promote 
people’s welfare, understood to mean their actual well-being in their lives.33 An inquiry 
into VSLY is an important way of answering that question. I also urge that agencies 
should be permitted to make adjustments from WTP when the beneficiaries of regulation 
lack information or when they would pay only a fraction of its cost. Of course there are 
hard questions here about the relationship between accuracy and administrability. 
Lacking good information about population-wide variations in WTP, government might 
relate on uniform figures, for life-years or lives, simply because more accurate numbers 
do not exist. 
 
In principle, the choice between lives and life-years is clear and simple. It gives 
the appearance of difficulty only because of a kind of optical illusion, which suggests 
some choice “between” older people and younger ones. But a discussion of the 
underlying problems provides a window onto a much larger and more complex set of 
questions. I touch on three more general issues. First, economists and policymakers 
should not take the willingness to pay criterion too seriously, and they are in danger of 
                                                 
30 See id.  
31 See 68 Fed. Reg. 5521 (Feb. 3, 2003), suggesting that those who endorse VSLY assume “that the public 
is willing to pay more money for a rule that saves an average of 10 life years per person than a rule that 
saves one year per person.”  
32 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Technical Addendum: Methodologies for the Benefit 
Analysis of the Clear Skies Initiatives 30-38 (2002); W. Kip Viscusi, Faral Tradeoffs (1993); Sunstein, The 
Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note. 
33 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L J 165 (1999). 
Throughout I use the idea of welfare in a nonsectarian sense. I do not mean to identify the idea with the 
utilitarian account, and I do not mean to reduce welfare to “happiness,” narrowly defined. As I use the 
term, it is agnostic on the controversial normative questions. On utitarianism and consequentialism, see 
Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J Phil 463 (1979); for general discussion, see Amartya Sen, 
Development As Freedom (1999). I believe that without resolving any difficult normative questions, it is 
possible to show that VSLY is preferable to VSL, and more generally to show that WTP is an inadequate 
proxy for welfare in many circumstances. On some of the empirical issues involved in measuring welfare, 
see Bruno S. Frey and Aliois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics 4-11 (2001);Alberto Alesina et al., 
Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different? (2001). 
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doing precisely that.34 As a measure of welfare, that criterion has several advantages, 
above all in circumstances in which regulation amounts to a forced exchange, requiring 
people to “buy” a benefit that they may or may not find it in their interest to buy. But in 
some contexts, no forced exchange is involved, because the beneficiaries of regulation do 
not have to pay for it. And in some contexts, willingness to pay is a poor proxy for 
welfare. In such contexts, regulators should abandon it and think about welfare directly if 
they can.35 I attempt to bring recent work on people’s mispredictions of the welfare 
effects of their own choices to bear on that question,36 with the suggestion that this work 
raises doubts about the use of WTP in many situations.37 There is a large research agenda 
here. 
 
The second issue has to do with the relationship between welfare and equity in the 
context of government regulation. While promoting welfare is the basic goal of 
environmental regulation, there are important ethical constraints on the pursuit of that 
goal. Those constraints support some, but not all, of the moral reservations about CBA 
and WTP that are stressed by their critics.38 As I have suggested, it would generally be 
unacceptable for government to adopt a higher VSL or VSLY for men and whites than 
for women and African-Americans.39 Related problems infect the use of QALYs in 
certain circumstances. Suppose, for example, that an otherwise identical government 
intervention could produce more QALYs if directed at the moderately disabled than at 
the severely disabled; is it so clear that the intervention should therefore favor the 
moderately disabled? I do not believe so. An understanding of the nature and the 
weaknesses of the ethical objections to VSLY helps explain the strength of objections to 
the promotion of welfare through regulation in other settings. 
 
Finally, I hope to make some progress in clarifying the debate between those who 
emphasize WTP and those who emphasize life-years and QALYs.40 I suggest that 
QALYs can be used as part of a cost-effectiveness analysis; it would be fully possible to 
investigate how many QALYs can be obtained for a given investment of resources. But 
when mortality and morbidity gains are converted into monetary equivalents, QALYs are 
                                                 
34 See id. 
35 Of course this is a difficult task, and I offer some thoughts here only about the easy cases. For general 
discussion, see Daniel Kahneman, et al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q. J 
Econ 375 (1997). 
36 See id.; Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Perspective on Economics, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 162 (Papers 
and Proceedings) (2003); George Loewenstein and David Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future 
Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds., WellBeing: The Foundations of 
Hedonic Psychology 85 (Russell Sage 1999). 
37 See Jonathan Gruber and Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarettes Taxes Make Smokers Happier? (2003, 
available at http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/20030605.htm), for an empirical demonstration that higher 
taxes on cigarettes actually increase the happiness of smokers, apparently because smoking decreases 
happiness and taxes decrease smoking. One of the many intriguing features of this essay is this: People are 
willing to pay for cigarettes, and thus in order to smoke, but smoking decreases welfare (on almost any 
understanding of that term) for many or most smokers.  
38 See Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, Priceless: Human Health, the Environment, and the Limits of 
the Market (forthcoming 2004). 
39 But see note supra. 
40 For an overview, see James Hammitt, QALYs vs. WTP, Harvard Center for Risk Analysis (2002). 
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insufficiently informative. Indeed they tell us nothing at all. The value of WTP is that it 
allows for the conversion. In some circumstances, affected people might be willing to pay 
a large amount for relatively few QALYs—if, for example, they are wealthy or inclined 
to spend much of their wealth on risk-reduction. In other circumstances, affected people 
might be willing to pay a small amount for relatively many QALYs—if, for example, 
they are poor or inclined to spend little of their wealth on risk-reduction. In fact this 
seemingly paradoxical result—higher WTP for few QALYs than for many—is far from 
unlikely. There is no question that other things being equal, more QALYs are better than 
fewer. But where the beneficiaries of regulation would pay all or almost all of its cost, 
WTP is normally the appropriate starting-point for the measurement of benefits.  
 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Part II discusses the choice 
between life-years and lives. Here I urge that life-years are an appropriate focus of 
regulatory concern. I also explore ethical and distributive constraints on the promotion of 
welfare through regulation; I suggest that such constraints are real and important, but that 
the use of life-years does not run afoul of them. Part III turns to the vexing question of 
monetization. I suggest that the use of WTP does not raise any special or distinctive 
conceptual issues in the context of life-years. Unfortunately, current evidence does not 
provide clear findings about how WTP for life-years or the remainder of life varies over 
the lifespan. A constant WTP is not supported by existing evidence, and there is some 
reason to think that older people are willing to pay more, per life-year, than younger 
people. I investigate this possibility and what might lie behind it. Part IV briefly identifies 
some options for policy. My most cautious suggestion here is that a life-years calculation 
should be part of the analysis that underlies policy judgments. Part V discusses three 
extensions of the analysis: the possibility of resolving the debate over life-years by 
reference to survey evidence; the choice between QALYs and WTP; and the fact that 
WTP might not adequately measure welfare. Part VI is the conclusion. 
 
II. Welfare and Equity, Lives and Life-Years 
 
Should government focus on statistical lives or instead statistical life-years? We 
should be clear on the nature of the opposition between the two. No regulatory program 
can eliminate death; if it is successful, it will merely extend life. If regulators focus solely 
on statistical lives, they will be lengthening lives, and they will be analyzing the 
consequences of regulation without regard to the extent of the lengthening. In fact they 
will be ignoring that intuitively relevant consideration. The initial question, then, is 
whether regulators should focus on statistical lives41 rather than life-years, even while 
acknowledging the fact that life extension is all that is involved.  
 
My goal in this section is to show that a focus on life-years should be found 
desirable from a variety of different perspectives, and that it does not offend justice-
related constraints on regulatory policy. I suggest that if welfare is the goal of regulatory 
policy, it is important to assess the number of life-years at stake. I suggest as well that 
                                                 
41 I deliberately leave ambiguous the meaning of “a focus.” At a minimum, I mean to suggest that 
government should assess the number of life-years at stake, and use the resulting figure when the ultimate 
decision is otherwise difficult. See Part V below. 
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such an assessment should be appealing to those who are concerned with fairness or 
reciprocity—and also to those who believe that as a matter of principle, regulatory policy 
should attempt to ensure citizens with lives of ordinary lengths. If these claims are 
correct, it should be possible to obtain an incompletely theorized agreement42 on the 
relevance of life-years—an agreement from a diverse set of theoretical perspectives, and 
one that does not depend on resolution of disagreements about the proper foundations of 
regulatory policy. 
 
A. Behind the Veil of Ignorance 
 
It should be clear that an emphasis on statistical lives neglects highly pertinent 
information. Why should analysts blind themselves to that information? Other things 
being equal, and as a matter of simple logic, the welfare gain from a program saving (say) 
1000 people between forty and sixty-five is unquestionably higher than the welfare gain 
from a program saving (say) 1000 people who are 65 and over. The former program does 
everything that the latter program does, and much else besides. After all, the sixty-five 
year-olds were themselves forty once, and it would be astonishing if the welfare gain, to 
each of us, of ten more years of life were equivalent to the welfare gain of forty more 
years of life.  
 
Nor does an emphasis on life-years disregard or downplay the welfare of older 
people. Once programs focussing on life-years are in place, old people will benefit from 
them no less than younger people, simply because those programs helped them at a 
younger stage and hence increased the likelihood that they would become old.43 In this 
sense, the idea that a life-years approach prefers younger people over older people is 
based on a kind of optical illusion—one that sees human life as a snapshot with everyone 
always at their current age, rather than a moving picture in which people age over time.44 
In any case the life-years approach considers everyone’s life-years the same, old people 
no less than young people, and hence will argue for careful attention to risks that face 
significant numbers of old people. 
 
To see the claim for considering life-years, imagine that people are placed behind 
a veil of ignorance,45 in which they do not know their personal characteristics; they are 
                                                 
42 On the general idea, see Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996). 
43 There is one exception to this conclusion: People who became old while government used statistical lives 
but after it switches to statistical life-years. Such people could not, by hypothesis, benefit from statistical 
life-years when they were younger. But it would extremely odd to invoke this short-term problem as a 
reason to continue with the idea of statistical lives if it is obviously inferior.  
44 Note that a claim for attention to life-years does not mean that the nation is devoting too little or too 
much in the way of resources to protect public health. Even if the United States doubled, tripled, or 
quadrupled the money it spends on environmental protection, for example, it would be necessary to decide 
how that money should be spend, and here it would remain necessary to choose between statistical lives or 
statistical life-years. 
45 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). I am using the idea of the veil of ignorance for heuristic 
purposes, but not in the way Rawls does. Rawls is interested in issues involving the basic structure of 
society, and it is not at all clear that he believes that the veil should be used to assess the justice of 
particular issues that are contested on grounds of justice. Nonetheless, I believe that the veil of ignorance is 
an illuminating way of testing the legitimacy of asking about life-years. 
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unaware of their race, sex, wealth, or (most pertinently) age. Note that the veil of 
ignorance is intended to be an extremely stringent constraint on choice, one that ensures 
that morally irrelevant factors will not play a biasing role.46 If those behind the veil would 
choose statistical life-years over statistical years, we have good reason to believe that life-
years are the appropriate focus of regulatory attention. Would people behind the veil be 
indifferent between a program that would eliminate risks that people would face at thirty 
and one that would eliminate otherwise identical risks faced at sixty? If people do not 
know how old they are, would they have the slightest difficulty concluding that it is better 
to eliminate a 1/50,000 risk faced by one million teenagers than a 1/50,000 risk faced by 
one million social security recipients? At first glance, the choice is entirely clear. The 
program that saves more life-years is better, because it provides more welfare to its 
beneficiaries, and does so without offending any ethical consideration.47 From behind a 
veil of ignorance, choosers would surely select the program that protects younger people, 
and hence would make life-years highly relevant to their own judgments. 
 
Or consider the following question: 
 
You do not know how long you will live. Which of the following two programs do 
you prefer: 
 
(a) A program that would eliminate, starting now and for the rest of your life 
after that point, a 1/200,000 risk of death.   
 
(b) A program that would eliminate, starting at sixty-five and for the rest of your 
life after that point, a 1/200,000 risk of death. 
 
It would be truly astonishing if most people did not prefer Program (a) over 
Program (b). Perhaps a preference for Program (a) reflects, in part, the discounting of 
future years, which (rationally or not48) may not loom so large in people’s current 
calculations.49 But the difference is highly likely to reflect not merely discounting but 
also the fact that Program (a) provides more risk-free years. In answering questions of 
this kind, reasonable people take account of the fact that the welfare benefit of Program 
(a) is significantly higher than the welfare benefit of Program (b). In fact Program (a) 
literally dominates Program (b): It provides everything that Program (b) does, and more 
years of reduced risk as well. It would be easy to design questions, for those behind the 
veil of ignorance, that have this characteristic. A focus on statistical life-years allows 
choosers to select programs that are better, on every dimension, than programs that seem 
identical to those who focus on statistical lives. 
 
                                                 
46 See id. It is noteworthy here that Rawls uses the veil of ignorance as a way of challenging utilitarianism 
itself. Id. 
47 I take this point up in more detail below. 
48 On hyberbolic discounting, see David Laibson, Intertemporal Decision Making, Encyclopedia of 
Cognitive Science (forthcoming), available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/laibson/papers 
/euler.pdf ; David Laibson and Christopher Harris, Hyberbolic Discounting and Consumption, available at 
id.; Richard Thaler, The Winner’s Curse (1993). 
49 On that issue, see Revesz, supra note. 
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Some cases are not as simple as this one, because they do not involve lifetime 
risks. We could imagine a Program (c) that eliminates a risk faced mostly by people 
between the ages of twenty and twenty-five, and a Program (d) that eliminates a risk 
faced mostly by people between the ages of seventy and seventy-five. Program (c) cannot 
be said to do everything that Program (d) does, and more. Program (d) protects people 
who are not protected by Program (c); there is a real choice here. But Program (c) does 
provide far more life-years, and because it enables (a certain number of) people to reach 
the age of seventy in the first place, it is surely preferable, other things being equal, to 
Program (d).  
 
B. Discrimination, Life-Years, and Welfare 
 
 Does a focus on life-years discriminate against older people in some invidious or 
unacceptable way? It is tempting to reach this conclusion. 50 But illicit discrimination is 
not involved. In fact it is the idea of statistical lives that is far more plausibly 
discriminatory than the idea of statistical life-years, because the former treats the 
remaining life-years of old people as more valuable than the remaining life-years of 
young people.51 And because every old person was once young, and (with a little luck) 
young people will eventually become old, an approach that emphasizes life-years does 
not treat old people unfairly. But to approach this question, let us begin with cases in 
which ethical constraints on the pursuit of welfare seem most insistent. 
 
 Suppose that we could measure welfare directly through a kind of hedometer. 
Suppose too that the hedometer does not rely on contentious conceptions of welfare; it is 
not narrowly limited to pleasure or happiness, and it includes the proper ingredients of 
welfare however these are defined.52 Suppose too that the hedometer is able to show that 
in a relevant population, white people receive more welfare from their lives than do 
African-Americans. Hence, let us suppose, a program that would save fifty white people 
(from cancer as a result of arsenic in drinking water, for example) will produce greater 
welfare gains than a program that would save sixty African-Americans (from air 
pollution in the inner city, for example). Certainly it is not unimaginable that the welfare 
gain is higher for programs that protect whites than for programs that protect an 
equivalent number of African-Americans (though the opposite might also be true). 
Gender differences are possible as well. Perhaps men flourish more than women (though 
here too the opposite might be true). If these examples seem too contentious, imagine that 
there are two social groups, the Flourishing and the Depressed. Members of both groups 
are easily identifiable, and their present and future welfare is captured in the names of 
their respective groups. By stipulation, a program that protects the lives of the 
Flourishing will produce more welfare than one that protects the lives of the Depressed. 
To sharpen the normative question, stipulate too that the Flourishing are responsible for 
                                                 
50 See McKie et al., supra note, at 47-72. 
51 Note that this is objectionable if, other things being equal, each person’s life-year counts for no less and 
no more than one. It is all the more objectionable if older people are seen as having a larger “stock” of life-
years and hence as comparatively “rich” in welfare terms. In that event, the life-years of younger people 
deserve higher priority on distributive grounds. I do not explore these complexities here. 
52 Hence the term eudaimeter seems to me more fitting but more unruly. See the discussion of eudaimonia 
in Marths Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness 142,-43, 343-72 (rev. ed. 2001). 
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the depression of the Depressed; that if not for the active efforts of the Flourishing, the 
Depression would come closer to flourishing too. 
 
This example is hypothetical and we lack hedometers. For the moment, let us turn 
to willingness to pay (WTP) instead.53 W. Kip Viscusi finds that African-American males 
have a significantly lower WTP than white males: $7.7 million versus $15.1 million.54 He 
also finds that African-American females have a lower WTP than white females: $8.7 
million versus $11.3.55 Thus the overall VSL for the white sample is $13.4 million, 
whereas the overall VSL for the African-American sample is $9.3 million, and the VSL 
for the male sample is $15.1, much higher than the VSL of $11.3 for the female sample.56 
If WTP is the basis for government policy, agencies should be assigning a much higher 
VSL for whites and men than for African-Americans and women. Viscusi himself does 
not reach this conclusion. He says that “because of differences in market opportunities, it 
is inappropriate to attribute the observed differences to a greater willingness to black 
workers to bear risk.”  
 
Of course the WTP numbers do not show or even suggest that when regulatory 
programs save lives, African-Americans and women gain less, in terms of welfare, than 
whites and men. By itself, the lower WTP demonstrates no such thing; as we shall see, 
WTP is merely a proxy for welfare, and an especially crude one in the face of disparities 
in income, wealth, and opportunities. Suppose that Donald Trump is willing to pay $500 
to eliminate 1/50,000 risk of having migraine headaches for the next year; suppose too 
that I am willing to pay only $25 to eliminate the same risk. The difference might well 
stem only from differences in wealth; the welfare loss, from migraine headaches, would 
be the same for the both of us. But it is certainly imaginable that some people, defined in 
demographic terms, do obtain more welfare from their lives than others. To see whether 
there are ethical constraints on the promotion of welfare through regulation, let us simply 
stipulate that this is the case. 
 
Should government devote more resources to the protection of those racial or 
ethnic groups that would gain more welfare from protection? Most people would find the 
very question absurd. In cases of these sorts, there is an equality-based check on the 
pursuit of greater welfare. In fact racial discrimination on this basis would be 
unconstitutional. But what is the source of the equality-based check? In the context of 
race discrimination, a central problem is that if African-Americans receive less welfare 
from their lives than do white people, a large part of the reason lies in social and legal 
practices, past and present, which help produce that state of affairs. This form of 
inequality reflects injustice. If government takes the inequality as a kind of given for the 
purposes of policy, it is compounding the injustice. In fact it is actually creating a kind of 
vicious circle, in which disparities in welfare justify increased disparities in welfare, 
which in turn justify ever-increasing disparities in welfare. The ethical intuition is simple: 
                                                 
53 See W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of A Statistical Life (2003), available on 
ssrn.com. 
54 See id. at 29. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 25. 
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Where disparities in the welfare effects of regulatory policies are a product of 
background injustice, government is properly blocked from taking those disparities into 
account.57 
 
 This point has implications for the debate over the use of quality-adjusted life 
years in regulatory policy. Insofar as the idea of QALYs is designed to rank health gains 
along with fatalities averted, it makes a great deal of sense; reductions in curable cancers, 
asthma attacks, and chronic bronchitis surely count as gains, whoever receives them. But 
suppose that people with severe physical and emotional ailments can be benefited only 
moderately by protective interventions—and hence that the number of QALYs, from 
such interventions, is relatively low, simply because those who are helped cannot, in light 
of their disability, be helped much. Should government concentrate instead on programs 
for people with less severe ailments? If government should not, it is because it is unjust to 
disfavor those whose aliments are most serious.58 This problem is not the same as the 
problem of disparities across lines of race and gender, but it raises related concerns. 
 
C. Life-Years, Fairness, and Reciprocity 
 
Thus far I have suggested that considerations of justice constrain the promotion of 
welfare through regulatory controls. But is the use of statistical life-years morally 
unacceptable in the same way as a VSL that discriminates on the basis of race or gender? 
This seems quite implausible. The initial point is that it is hard to argue that injustice 
accounts for the welfare disparity between protection of a thirty-year-old and protection 
of a sixty-year-old. The disparity comes from the simple fact that younger people have 
more years left. Now that disparity might itself be an injustice if social practices, or even 
nature, singled out certain groups of people and gave them shorter lives. Hence the use of 
life-years would indeed be problematic if it systematically burdened members of 
identifiable social groups (an issue to which I will return). But by itself, the notion of life-
years is demographically neutral in both theory and practice.59  
 
Under the life-years approach, older people are treated worse for only one reason: 
They are older. This is not an injustice. Every old person was young once, and every 
young person will be old too (if given the chance). In fact an important form of 
reciprocity is built into the life-years approach. If regulatory policy is based on life-years, 
every person will, in a sense, be both benefited and burdened, and in exactly the same 
way. Indeed, every person will be both a beneficiary and a victim of the relevant 
discrimination. People—the same people—will be benefited when they are younger and 
burdened when they are older. They have no cause to complain of an approach from 
                                                 
57 I am putting to one side the possibility of adopting welfare-promoting regulatory policies alongside 
redistributive tax-and-spending policies. See below. 
58 See the discussion of the natural lottery in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1973). 
59 There is a possible qualification here if African-Americans (for example) live shorter lives, and if VSLY 
therefore ensures that African-American lives will be valued, on average, less than white lives. In theory, 
this is indeed a possible problem. But in practice, regulatory policies that use VSLY do not run into that 
problem, because they are too coarse-grained to discriminate in this fashion. 
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which they gained at an earlier stage.60 It is hard to see how the relevant form of 
discrimination is illicit. In fact it is not clear that it is a form of discrimination at all. 
Everyone’s life year counts as no less and no more than one. In fact it would be possible 
to conclude that this argument from reciprocity is a free-standing justification of the life-
years approach, putting issues of welfare entirely to one side. 
 
In an important sense, a focus on statistical lives is discriminatory, not a focus on 
statistical life-years. The former discriminates against younger people, simply because it 
treats each of their years as less valuable than those of older people. A program that uses 
statistical lives accords far more value to each remaining year of an old person’s life than 
to each remaining year of a young person’s life.61 The point is not purely semantic. 
Suppose that we conclude that lifetime well-being is what matters, and that other things 
being equal, policies should not give some people more lifetime well-being than others. 
A policy that looks solely at statistical lives will violate this principle. Compare a group 
of people who die from a certain risk at fifty with a group of people who die from the 
same risk at seventy. Other things being equal, the latter group has received significantly 
more lifetime well-being than the former, and attention to statistical lives forces 
government to ignore this fact. If anything, an age-neutral statistical lives approach is 
subject to a claim of illicit discrimination, not an approach that focuses on life-years. 
 
A possible argument would come from the criminal law. Those who kill older 
people are not punished less harshly than those who kill younger people. In fact it would 
be extremely surprising to find a criminal sentencing policy that imposes higher 
sentences on those who kill people thirty and under than on those who kill people fifty 
and over.62 If criminal punishment treats lives as equivalent, and does not make life-years 
relevant, why, it might be asked, should regulation be any different? Part of the answer 
lies in the sheer heinousness of murder. The intentional killing of another human being is, 
in terms of its consequences, so bad that the age of the victim is a matter of relative 
indifferences. Perhaps the system of criminal justice focuses not solely on social 
consequences but also on the character of the act and the perpetrator. If this is the focus, a 
murderer of a young person is unlikely to be worse than a murderer of an older person.  
 
Distinctions among different kinds of crimes raise many complexities, and it is 
certainly reasonable to think that a murder of another human being regulation is more 
                                                 
60 Arguments from reciprocity are not always convincing. Suppose, for example, that certain people were 
beneficiaries of racial discrimination in the past, and at some future point they are harmed by racial 
discrimination. At least it is not clear that the latter form of discrimination can be justified by reference to 
the former. If not, the problem is that discrimination is unjust. If my arguments in the text are correct, this 
problem does not apply to the life-years criterion, because there is no injustice.  
61 For a utilitarian, this approach is objectionable because each life-year, other things being equal, is an 
equal source of utility, and hence a program should prefer more life-years rather than fewer. We could 
imagine a kind of utilitarian or consequentialist who would give higher priority to the welfare of the least 
well-off. In this context, who counts as the least well-off? In an important sense, young people fall in that 
category, because they have not yet had the opportunity to accumulate welfare; older people already have a 
large welfare “stock.” But a resolution of these complexities is not important for my analysis here. 
62 It would be less surprising to find a sentencing policy that imposes severe punishment on those who 
murder children. But here the reason for the severity would be the special vulnerability of children, not the 
fact that they have many life-years left. 
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analogous to the system of civil damages, which do seem to turn on life-years. Many 
state courts, including several state supreme courts, have calculated damages in wrongful 
death cases by assigning a net value to each remaining year the decedent would likely 
have lived. These courts have used life expectancy tables and projected annual earnings 
to determine lost income.63 Several courts have gone further and used estimated life 
expectancy to determine damages for loss of society or consortium.64 In these states, the 
lives of young people are presumptively more valuable than those of the elderly. In this 
respect, the use of life-years, as part of an understanding of appropriate policy, is hardly 
foreign to the legal system. 
 
Consider another way to get at the issue. On one view, people have a moral 
entitlement to have a chance to live to the end of a human life of normal length.65 It 
follows that there is a special moral objection if members of a relevant population are 
dying at the age of thirty or forty, an objection that does not apply if members of a 
relevant population are dying at the age of seventy or eighty. If people have a moral 
entitlement to avoid (excessive risks of) premature death, then government legitimately 
devotes special attention to otherwise identical risks faced at relatively early places in the 
lifespan. Those who emphasize the importance of providing people with ordinary 
longevity should find a focus on life-years compatible with their goals, and highly 
congenial insofar as that focus makes it more likely that citizens will have a chance to 
have lives of ordinary length.66 In any case a special virtue of focussing on life-years is 
that it ensures attention to a crucial question, which is whether affected citizens have had 




                                                 
63 See, e.g., Payne v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 60 P.3d 469, 473 (Mont. 2002); Romero v. Byers, 872 
P.2d 840, 845-46 (N.M. 1994); Bemenderfer v. Williams, 745 N.E.2d 212, 219 (Ind. 2001); Davidson v. 
Lindsey, 104 S.W.3d 483, 493 n.2 (Tenn. 2003). 
64 See, e.g., Thomas v. Hilburn, 654 So.2d 898, 903 (Miss. 1995); Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul 
Int’l, 745 N.E.2d 755, 766 (Ind. 2001). 
65 See Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development 78 (2000). Nussbaum lists, as the first of 
“central human functional capabilities, “Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not 
dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.” Complex issues are raised 
by the application of this idea to the context of social risks (and hence I do not adopt her phrasing here). 
Suppose, for example, that citizens in a population of 200 million are exposed to a median annual mortality 
risk of 1/500,000 from all causes (including, for example, motor vehicle accidents, cigarette smoking, 
alcohol use, air pollution, water pollution, pesticides, occupational accidents, homicide, hunger, and much 
more). This would be an exceptionally safe population—safer, in fact, than any society in the history of the 
world. But of that population, 400 people would die each year, many of them prematurely. 
66 A focus on life-years is not, of course, the same as an effort to ensure that everyone has a chance to have 
a lifespan of ordinary length. My only suggestion is that an approach that looks at statistical lives, and does 
not look at life-years, is less likely to provide that chance than an approach that make life-years relevant.  
67 Note that this is a different question from the life-years question, though it is overlapping. Consider two 
programs. (a) Program A would remove a statistical risk from a population of people who are forty; their 
life expectancy is sixty-five. (b) Program B would remove the same statistical risk from a population of 
people who are fifty; their life expectancy is eighty. On the life-years approach, Program B is to be 
preferred. But if we are focussing on the numbers of years that people have had already, Program A might 
be better.  
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D. Literal Age Discrimination? 
 
Do these arguments undermine the widely acceptable principle against age 
discrimination? If so, the arguments might be thought to have mischaracterized the 
ethical issues involved—or to have broad and perhaps radical implications, calling for a 
rethinking of the broadly accepted prohibition on age discrimination.  
 
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,68 employers are forbidden 
from discriminating against people over forty. They cannot choose a thirty-year-old over 
a fifty-year-old. Indeed, they cannot discriminate even if they can claim that they are 
relying on a statistically sound generalization—as sound as those on which employers 
and others rely every day.69 It is not acceptable for an employer to conclude that thirty-
year-old teachers are more fit, energetic, and creative than fifty-year-old teachers, even if 
this is generally true, and even if it is difficult, in individual cases, to test creativity before 
people have started to work.70 Nor would it be permissible for an employer to adapt the 
argument I have been defending here. An employer could not say that he wants to hire 
people who have a large number of life-years left—even if the employer could say, not 
implausibly, that he would like employees with many life-years rather than fewer, and 
even if he could add, also not implausibly, that a life-years approach to hiring does not, in 
a sense, discriminate against anyone. (Recall that every older person was young once and 
that every younger person, if lucky, will eventually be older too.) The question, in short, 
is whether it is possible to defend the use of statistical life-years over statistical lives 
while also accepting the prohibition on age discrimination in employment. I believe that 
it is. 
 
To be sure, the prohibition on age discrimination in employment does not have 
the same moral standing as the corresponding prohibitions on race and sex 
discrimination.71 But it is easy to see how the former prohibition might be justified. Some 
age discrimination is undoubtedly a product of unthinking prejudice—of a false belief 
that older people are unable to engage in certain tasks.72 If prejudice is frequently 
responsible for age discrimination, perhaps age discrimination should generally be 
banned. A supplemental rationale would be that discrimination on the basis of age inflicts 
an unusual kind of dignitary harm—one that makes it different from, and worse than, 
most kinds of employment-related injury. If an employee is fired because he is fifty-five, 
or not hired for that reason, the psychological and dignitary injury is plausibly worse, 
even far worse, than that faced by people who are fired or hired for other reasons. At least 
this point seems to animate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.73 
 
                                                 
68 See 29 USC 621-34. 
69 See Samuel Estreicher and Michael C. Harper, Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination and 
Employment Law 445 (2000). In some narrow circumstances, however, age might be a bona fide 
occupation qualification. See Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 US 400 (1985). 
70 See id. 
71 See Samuel Issacharoff & Erica W. Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination? The 
ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U.L Rev. 780, 783 (1997). 
72 See Estreicher and Harper, supra note, at 444-45. 
73 See id. 
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The key point is that whether prejudice or dignitary harm is the basis of the 
ADEA, the same problems do not raise doubts about the government’s use of statistical 
life-years. When government uses life-years, it is not because it is prejudiced against 
older people or acting on the basis of unreliable stereotypes about them. There is no 
overgeneralization here. Nor is it easy to show that a dignitary harm, of the sort involved 
in the employment context, is an issue here. It is one thing to be told, by a specific 
employer, that you will be fired or not hired because you are too old. It is quite another 
thing for the government to use an approach that focuses on life-years rather than lives. 
To be sure, it is possible to characterize such an approach in a way that does inflict 
dignitary harm. Perhaps some objections to life-years stem from a perception that this 
measures values older people less, treating them as “worth” some fraction of younger 
people. But these objections rest on a highly misleading way of framing what life-years is 
all about. 
 
E. Bad Luck in the Natural Lottery (with a note on sex discrimination) 
 
 There is, however, one set of ethical constraints on the life-years approach. 
Compare two programs: 
 
(a) Program A would eliminate a risk faced by people who are ten years old or 
younger, but who have a life expectancy of forty years or less, because they have 
a preexisting condition that will likely lead to premature mortality. 
(b) Program B would eliminate a risk faced by people who are thirty years old, but 
who have a life expectancy of seventy or more, because they are in good health. 
 
On the life-years approach, Program B is better. But is it better in principle? Note 
that if it is objectionable, it is not for the same reason as an approach that discriminates 
on the basis of race or sex. Social injustice is not responsible for the low life expectancy 
of the people who would be helped by Program A. (Let us so stipulate; if social injustice 
is involved, the case is close to those of race and sex discrimination.) Instead the 
problem, for the beneficiaries of Program A, is bad luck in the “natural lottery.”74 People 
whose life expectancy is low, as a result of preexisting conditions, have been dealt an 
unfortunate blow by fate. In my view, government should take reasonable steps to 
ameliorate such blows, and should not make them worse through social policies. A life-
years approach that is blind to the natural lottery would be unjust, 
 
This point very much bears on medical interventions and on government funding 
for medical projects. But it is rarely raised in regulatory policy. Typically government is 
deciding whether to adopt regulations that reduce pollution or otherwise increase safety 
across large populations. From the standpoint of the natural lottery, the life-years 
criterion does not raise objections in the vast bulk of such cases.75 But it might well turn 
                                                 
74 See Rawls, supra note, at XX. 
75 Compare another puzzle. (1) Program A would save 1000 infants. (2) Program B would save 1000 ten-
year-olds. On the life-years approach, Program A is of course better, other things being equal. On 
willingness to pay grounds, taken up in part III, this is much less clear; there are hard empirical and 
conceptual questions here. And there are theoretical reasons to question a preference for Program A. 
 18
out to create intriguing questions in the context of programs that disproportionately 
benefit men or women. The life expectancy of women is higher than the life expectancy 
of men. As of 2000, the average life expectancy for men at birth was 74.1, but 79.5 for 
women.76 A breast cancer prevention program might well protect more life-years than an 
otherwise identical program designed to protect men.77 In my view, a neutral use of the 
life-years approach should not be thought to be unacceptably discriminatory even if it 
produces more attention to women than to men, though a formal commitment to sex 




These points suggest that in deciding whether to regulate, government should 
consider life-years saved, not merely lives saved (a misleading way of framing the 
alternative, which is really lives extended).78 And if life-years are the focus, it would be 
possible to engage in cost-effectiveness analysis, seeing how many life-years are obtained 
for given investments in regulatory protection. Government might therefore reallocate 
some of the resources devoted to programs protecting the elderly to programs protecting 
younger people.79 But suppose that government seeks to engage not merely in cost-
effectiveness analysis but also in cost-benefit analysis. If this is what it seeks to do, it will 
have to turn life-years into monetary equivalents. For most economists, the valuation of 
regulatory benefits, and the monetization of life-years, depends on WTP.80 Should WTP 
be used here?  
 
At first glance, the use of WTP, as a way of monetizing benefits, creates no 
special or novel issues in the context of life-years. Under the economic framework, the 
goal should be to calculate people’s WTP for statistical years over the lifespan. We 
                                                                                                                                                 
Because Program B would save people who have accumulated memories and experiences, the individual 
loss might be higher; and because of the investment of family and friends, the social loss might be higher as 
well. For relevant discussion, see Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion (1996). A full account would of 
course have to come to terms with this question, which might justify further constraints on the use of life-
years. 
76 See http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifexpec.htm. 
77 To make the issue more concrete, compare two programs. (1) Program A would save 1000 women with a 
median age of sixty. (2) Program B would save 1000 men with a median age of sixty. Under the life-years 
approach, Program A is better, because it would protect more life-years. 
78 There are some exotic variations that I do not deal with here. Compare two programs. (1) Program A 
would save 50 people who are ten years old. (2) Program B would save 100 people who are forty-six years 
old. If life expectancy is 80, then the first program would save 3500 life-years, whereas the second would 
save 3400 life-years. Is it so clear that program A is to be preferred? If not, it might be because reasonable 
people would prefer something like a weighted average of lives saved and life-years saved, so that a large 
number of people, and a small number of life-years, would receive more attention than life-years alone 
suggest, just as a small number of people, and a large number of life-years, would receive less attention. I 
do not deal with that possibility here. If government concentrated on life-years for purposes of regulation, it 
is likely that this issue would balance out in the end. The area of medical treatment is one in which the 
issue might have more practical importance. 
79 This would be an extension of the reallocations aimed at in Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 
(1993). 
80 See, e.g., V. Kerry Smith, Do the “Near” Elderly Value Mortality Risks Differently? (unpublished 
manuscript 2002). 
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would want to know, for example, how much thirty-year-olds, forty-year-olds, fifty-year-
olds, and more are willing to pay to eliminate or reduce risks faced in some or all of their 
remaining life-years. WTP for statistical life-years would be compiled by finding the 
relevant numbers and applying the appropriate discount rate. To be sure, this would be a 
daunting empirical task.81 But in principle, it is a conventional application of the 
economic framework. It would also seem to promise greater accuracy than an approach 
that uses a uniform number for statistical lives. It would be astonishing if that uniform 
number accurately captures the WTP of people at diverse points along the spectrum of 
possible ages.82 
 
I do not intend to reach any final conclusions here about the place of WTP in 
regulatory policy. But I do address an evidentiary gap and a possible paradox. The gap 
consists of the absence of evidence of how VSLY varies over people’s lifespans. We do 
not know how much thirty-year-olds are willing to pay to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk of 
losing their remaining life-years, and how that amount compared with the WTP of fifty-
year-olds to eliminate the same risk. If we are interested in measuring actual WTP, it 
would be surprising to find a constant amount over the life-span. Unfortunately, the 
relevant amounts cannot be found in the existing literature. 
 
The paradox is the possibility that WTP would actually be higher to protect older 
people than younger people—if and because older people are willing to pay more to 
eliminate statistical risks than younger people. This is a paradox, because it suggests that 
WTP might be higher to produce lower gains in terms of life-years. One of my goals is to 
explain how and why this might be so. I also suggest that whether for lives or for life-
years, WTP has its strongest claims in cases in which the beneficiaries of regulation must 
also pay for it. Finally, I explore an issue for which the life-years debate can be seen as an 
opening wedge: whether government should use a uniform WTP or instead a highly 
variable one, making numerous distinctions according to context. But let us begin with 
some basics. 
 
A. WTP and VSL in General 
 
Advocates of the WTP criterion urge that as a measure of welfare, WTP has the 
promise of administrability.83 While it is not always simple to calculate WTP, market 
measures and contingent valuation studies provide a great deal of information. The 
                                                 
81 Note in this regard that there are complex relationships among risks and the lifespan. Some risks, for 
example, might be constant over the remainder of life, so that a thirty-year-old faces (say) a 1/1,000,000 
chance of death, from that risk, for each of her remaining years. But other risks might be somewhat higher 
or somewhat lower in later years. If the calculation were to seek accuracy, it would use fine-grained 
numbers about WTP over the lifespan for different risks. Administrable numbers would of course be far 
less fine-grained.  
82 There is a vexing question about how to calculate the VSL or VSLY of children and young people, who 
lack much willingness to pay. See notes infra for discussion and references. 
83 The point should not be overstated. Studies of WTP show a great deal of variability. See Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L.J. 2255 (2002) (showing a range from $1 million to $14 
million), and a recent study, based on 1990s data, suggests that the current figure of $6.1 million might well 
be doubled. See W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of A Statistical Life (2003), 
available on ssrn.com. (finding values as high as $15.1 million in the case of white males). 
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government has placed heavy reliance on labor market studies, which suggest a WTP in 
the general range of $6.1 million.84 These studies purport to show that in the market, 
people receive a certain level of compensation to run statistical risks, revealing an 
ascertainable “price” for potential hazards.85 In ordinary markets, there is a market for 
safety, with some products (like Volvos) receiving higher prices partly because they 
reduce statistical risks. People are willing to pay specified amounts for risk reduction. On 
one view, markets provide relevant information about appropriate prices, and regulators 
should draw on that information, refusing to force people to buy more than they would (if 
well-informed).  
 
Of course it is possible to question existing studies on various grounds and to ask 
whether real-world data actually reveal people’s WTP for increases in safety.86 The 
government relies on twenty-six studies, finding that $6.1 million is the mean of a diverse 
area of figures—an approach that has a large degree of arbitrariness in itself.87 Contingent 
valuation studies, asking people how much they are willing to pay for such increases, 
might seem to produce more reliable answers, simply because the answers to such 
questions are far less “noisy” than market behavior. But contingent valuation studies raise 
serious problems of their own.88 
 
Let us assume that these difficulties can be solved and that existing studies can 
indeed measure people’s WTP for increases in safety. There is certainly a connection 
between WTP and welfare. The more that someone is willing to pay for a benefit, the 
more likely it is that the benefit would actually promote that person’s welfare. But if 
welfare is our guide, the WTP criterion might be criticized on several grounds. Consider 
a few: 
 
1. Willingness to pay is dependent on ability to pay. As a result, poor people might 
be unwilling to pay much for a regulatory benefit even though they would greatly 
gain from it, and wealthy people might be willing to pay a great deal for a 
regulatory benefit even though they would receive very little from it.89  
2. Some people lack relevant information, and hence they might not be willing to 
pay for goods that would, in fact, produce significant welfare benefits for them. 
They might also be willing to pay a great deal for goods that would not, in fact, 
                                                 
84 See Technical Addendum, supra note, at 32 (figure of $6.12 million); Sunstein, supra note. 
85 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1994); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 30 J 
Econ Lit 1912 (1993); W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph Aldy, The Value of A Statistical Life: A Critical Review, 
J Risk and Uncertainty (forthcoming 2003). 
86 See, e.g., William T. Dickens, Differences between Risk Premiums in Union and Nonunion Wages and 
the Case for Occupational Safety Regulation, 74 Am Econ Rev 320 (1984) (dividing workers between 
union and nonunion sectors and using the results to doubt the idea of compensating wage differentials); 
William T. Dickens, Assuming the Can Opener: Hedonic Wage Estimates and the Value of Life, in A 
Hedonics Primer for Economists and Attorneys 145 (1992) (generally challenging those estimates); Peter 
Dorman, Markets and Mortality (1996) (same). 
87 Technical Addendum, supra, at 32. 
88 See Peter Diamond & Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number, 
8 J. Econ. Persp. 45, 49-52 (1994); Note, Ask A Silly Question, 105 Harv L Rev 1981 (1992). 
89 As we shall see, this point does not justify abandoning WTP in cases in which poor people must pay the 
full cost of the benefit that government is providing, at least if those people are adequately informed. 
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produce significant welfare benefits for them. It is well-documented that people’s 
welfare judgments at time of decision (“anticipated welfare”) do not always 
match their experience (“experience welfare”).90 
3. People’s preferences might have adapted to deprivation or injustice.91 Hence they 
might be unwilling to pay anything for goods from which they would benefit. If 
government relies on WTP, it will not engage in actions that might turn out to be 
welfare-promoting.  
4. As I have noted, measures of WTP rely on hedonic pricing or contingent 
valuation studies that elicit monetary amounts from individuals, with the apparent 
assumption that such individuals will be paying those amounts whether or not 
other people are doing so as well.92 But people care about their relative economic 
position, not simply their absolute economic position,93 and hence they would be 
likely to be willing to pay significantly more if they could be assured that others 
would be paying for the regulatory benefit as well. The reason is that when 
everyone is paying for the benefit, people can maintain their relative economic 
position while also receiving the benefit. Because existing studies do not take 
account of this point, they might undervalue regulatory protections.94 
 
I do not intend to come to terms with these problems here; I will bracket the more 
general challenges to WTP itself and assess the questions here within the existing 
framework, in which WTP plays a central role. But it is noteworthy that actual agency 
use of WTP does not run afoul of most of these problems.95 The most important point 
here is agencies do not give a lower VSL for poor people than for rich people; they use a 
uniform figure.96  
 
B. WTP and Age: Evidence 
 
If WTP is the proper measure of VSLY, it would follow that in order to convert 
life-years into monetary equivalents, regulators should investigate how much people, at 
various stages of life, are willing to pay for years of risk reduction. In principle, WTP 
might or might not vary over the lifespan; there is no good a priori answer to that 
question. For children, the elicitation of WTP is especially vexing, because children 
usually do not have significant assets of their own, and because parental WTP might not 
                                                 
90 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman and J. Snell, Predicting Changing Taste: Do People Know What They Will 
Like?, 5 J. Behavioral Decision Making 187 (1992); George Loewenstein and David Schkade, Wouldn’t It 
Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds, 
WellBeing: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 85 (Russell Sage 1999). 
91 See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (1983); Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2002); 
Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (1985). 
92 See Robert Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, supra note. 
93 See Robert Frank, Luxury Fever (1999). 
94 See Frank and Sunstein, supra note.  
95 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are 
Distorted, in Cost-Benefit Analysis 269 (Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner eds. 2001). 
96 See id. Note that it would be reasonable to do exactly that in the context of forced exchanges. Unless 
there is some informational problem, poor people are not helped when regulation forces them to pay $200 
for a benefit that is worth only $50 to them. In such cases, perhaps government should impose regulation 
but subsidize poor people to ensure that they do not have to pay for it. I return to this point below. 
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be a good proxy here.97 EPA relies on a single WTP as a default assumption,98 but there 
is no simple theoretical justification for this approach. And perhaps studies would show 
that older people are willing to pay more for each of their remaining life-years than 
younger people are willing to pay for each of theirs—so that even if we focus on life-
years, the “remainder of life” for older people is as high as or even higher than that for 
younger people. Imagine, for example, that people who are 65 and over are not willing to 
pay less to eliminate a life-time risk of 1/500,000 than are people who are 40 and under. 
We could speculate about different possible results here. Perhaps labor market studies 
would show that the value of a statistical life steadily decreases over the life-span99; 
perhaps they would show that VSL steadily increases; perhaps VSL rises to a certain age 
and declines thereafter. On one view, the right question for purposes of policy is what 
well-designed studies actually establish.  
 
Unfortunately, no studies provide clear answers to the key questions. Hence an 
approach that uses life-years cannot easily translate the relevant figure into dollar 
equivalents. If government uses a uniform number—say, $172,000 per life year100—it 
will not be tracking actual WTP if WTP varies across the lifespan and if the program 
protects people at various ages. Perhaps the uniform number captures the population-
wide mean and is therefore accurate (enough). But it is possible that within the economic 
framework, a life-years approach that uses a uniform VSLY will produce wildly 
inaccurate measures of benefits.  
 
Consider a recent investigation that attempts to resolve exactly that issue.101 The 
study asked respondents in the United States and Canada to state their willingness to pay 
for risk reductions of 1-in-1000 and 5-in-1000. Demographic information was collected, 
so that the authors could hold constant relevant variables (such as health and income). A 
key finding is that in the United States, age had no impact on WTP. In the 1-in-1000 
condition, VSL estimates exceeded $4 million; the estimates were less than half that in 
the 5-in-1000 condition.102 But in both cases, older people did not show a lower WTP 
than younger people. For Canada, age generally had no effect, but with one exception: 
people over 70 were willing to pay about one-third less than others for risk reduction.103 
The authors conclude that in general, their results support government’s “current practice 
with regard to treatment of age,”104 because they suggest that WTP does not vary across 
the lifespan. If this study is correct, then multiplication of the number of statistical life-
                                                 
97 For an overview that turns out to be highly tentative and indeterminate, see Environmental Protection 
Agency, Children’s Health Valuation Handbook (2003). 
98 See id. at 3-12-3-13, referring to Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Preparing Economic 
Analyses (2000). 
99 For a result in this general direction, see Viscusi and Aldy, supra note. 
100 See note supra. 
101 See Anna Alberini et al., Does the Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age and Health Status? 
Evidence from the United States and Canada (unpublished manuscript 2002), available at 
http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDF_files/0219.pdf. 
102 See id. at 14. 
103 See id. at 16. 
104 Id. at17. 
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years by a uniform VSLY will produce erroneous numbers, above all because it will 
understate the total WTP of older people for their remaining years. 
 
Or consider another study based on labor market data.105 The simple result is that 
older workers require significantly higher, not lower, compensation to accept increase in 
fatality risks on the job. For the full sample, the estimated VSL is $5.31 million, well 
within the range of existing EPA figures.106 The authors actually find that VSL increases 
with age, from $7.4 million for workers between 51 and 55, to $10.2 million for workers 
between 56 and 60, to $14 million for workers between 61 and 65.107 The implication is 
that regulatory policy should give a higher monetary value to statistical risks faced by 
older people. Instead of a “senior death discount,” regulators should use a “youth death 
discount.” If the findings in this study are right, the “remainder of life” is actually worth 
more to older people, even though they have fewer life-years left. Any exercise of 
multiplication—of life-years times actual VSLY across the life-span—would actually 
result in higher numbers for those who are older, notwithstanding what I have said above 
about welfare. Hence a uniform VSLY would produce real inaccuracy. 
 
I do not mean to say here whether the particular findings in these two studies are 
convincing. Other studies find that older people show a lower VSL than younger people 
do.108 This finding seems intuitive, simply because older people have fewer years to 
protect. But if VSL does not decline with age, it remains to explain why.109 The simplest 
answer is that older people have less to do with their money and hence lower opportunity 
costs (unless the bequest motive is very strong). Because fewer years of life remain, 
savings are a lower priority, and older people have less, in general, on which to use their 
resources. But the full story is somewhat speculative and certainly more complex.  
 
A possible contributing factor is wealth itself: If older people have more income 
than younger people, their WTP will be higher, and for reasons that have nothing to do 
with welfare. Some of the studies, finding no age differences in WTP, do control for 
income.110 But they do not control for wealth, which is an important missing variable. 
Older people have more savings even if they have lower incomes, and hence the higher 
WTP might reflect a wealth effect. (Recall that wealthy people will show a higher WTP 
simply because they have more money.) There is a complementary explanation. It might 
be that older people have a comparatively high WTP—as high as or higher than that of 
younger people—because they have fewer years left in which to spend. Suppose, for 
example, that people over sixty are willing to pay $100 to eliminate a risk of 1/50,000, 
                                                 
105 See Smith et al., supra note, available at http://www.rff.org/valuinghealthoutcomes/VHO_Readings.htm. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 15. 
108 See Viscusi and Aldy, supra note, at 50-53. 
109 I am assuming that well-conducted WTP studies will not find decreases as remaining life-years 
decrease. It is possible, of course, that some such studies will find such decreases, see id., as the studies 
discussed supra do not. I am attempting in this section to show that even if older people do not show a 
lower WTP to reduce statistical risks, this fact can be explained while acknowledging that other things 
being equal, a program that provides more life-years is better on welfare grounds than one that provides 
fewer.  
110 See Alberini et al., supra note. 
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whereas people under forty are willing to pay only $75 to eliminate such a risk. It may be 
that the younger people want to use their disposable income on other things, including 
savings (of less use to the elderly111), whereas for older people, the reduction of risk is a 
high priority. In short, older people have lower opportunity costs. Unless the bequest 
motive is powerful, they will be especially willing to use what they have to reduce 
statistical risks. 
 
This possibility is related to another one: The comparatively high WTP for older 
people might reflect the preciousness of the relatively fewer years that remain. Consider 
two questions: 
 
1. You are 75 years old. How much would you be willing to pay to avoid a 10 
percent chance of dying one year earlier than you otherwise would? 
2. You are 25 years old. How much would you be willing to pay to avoid a 10 
percent chance of dying one year earlier than you otherwise would? 
 
It is easily imaginable that question (a) would produce a far higher WTP than 
question (b), for respondents answering hypothetically, and even more predictably for 
respondents who are actually 75 and 25 respectively. It may well be that the perceived 
value of any given year increases, for some or many, when the number of remaining 
years declines. For people who are 25, the prospect of losing one year of life might not 
loom terribly large, and for people who are 75, that loss is probably a matter of major 
importance. Undoubtedly the different answers are a product of discounting, rational or 
otherwise; but this is not all that is involved. For those with fewer years remaining, each 
particular year becomes all the more valuable. 
 
In some cases, the absence of age-related differences in WTP might well be a 
product of the contingent valuation setting. Some studies of contingent valuation show 
“scope neglect”: people are willing to pay the same to protect 1000, 10,000, and 100,000 
migratory birds.112 The absence of an age effect may reflect a similar phenomenon. It is 
possible that in contingent valuation studies or in market behavior, the number of years is 
“telescoped” into a kind of single unit, called “the rest of life.” Hence the amount that 
people are willing to pay for a 1/500,000 risk of losing “the rest of life” might not much 
vary across the life-span.  
 
It is also possible that older people are generally risk-averse, and differences in 
risk preferences might help account for differences in WTP. Other things being equal, it 
is imaginable that older people would pay more to reduce an annual risk of 1/500,000 
than younger people would, simply because younger people are more willing to run low-
probability risks. According to expected utility theory, risk-related judgments are made 
by multiplying the extent of the harm by its probability; but according to prospect theory, 
people are generally risk-averse with respect to low-probability risks of catastrophe.113 
                                                 
111 The possibility of bequests introduces some complications. 
112 See Daniel Kahneman and Jack Knetch, Valuing Public Goods, 22 J. Env Econ and Mgt. 57 (1992). 
113 See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in 
Choices, Values, and Frames 17, 20 (Daniel Kahneman ed. 2000); for a clear discussion with application to 
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Perhaps older people are, with respect to such risks, even more risk-averse than the 
population median. For present purposes, it is not necessary to choose among these 
various explanations. My central point is that there are plausible reasons that WTP might 
not decline with remaining life-years. 
 
C. Using WTP? Regulation As Forced Exchange 
 
Now let us turn to the central question of valuation. I have suggested that 
government should focus on life-years rather than lives. But should life-years be valued 
by using WTP for them? My ultimate conclusion is that WTP is, in principle, a good 
place to start. The case for using WTP for statistical life-years is not weaker than the case 
for using WTP for statistical lives. But there are a number of complexities here, and they 
illuminate some of the virtues and vices of using WTP in general. 
 
Begin with the simplest set of cases: Those in which the cost of the regulatory 
benefit is entirely borne by those who are supposed to benefit from it. I suggest that in 
this set of cases, WTP is generally the appropriate measure unless an informational 
problem or cognitive error is distorting people’s assessments.114  
 
To see why, compare two programs: 
 
A. Program A would mostly benefit people thirty years old and under. The median 
WTP, for such people, is $50 to eliminate a lifetime statistical risk of 1/200,000.  
 
B.  Program B would mostly benefit people sixty-five and older. The median WTP, 
for such people, is $100 to eliminate a lifetime statistical risk of 1/200,000.  
 
Suppose that in both cases, the full cost of the benefit would be paid by those who 
receive it. I have argued that the welfare benefit of program A is higher than the welfare 
benefit of program B. But it does not follow that the government should adopt a more 
expensive regulation to implement program A than to implement program B. So long as 
the beneficiaries of both programs would pay their full cost, so long as there are no third-
party effects, and so long as people’s WTP is not distorted by informational problems or 
cognitive errors, government should not impose a cost of over $50 on those who would 
benefit from program A. At the same time, it should be willing to impose a cost of up to 
$100 on those who would benefit from program B.  
 
Under the analysis I am suggesting, government should be willing to impose more 
costly and aggressive regulations in cases in which the anticipated welfare gain (on one 
side of the equation) is lower. Is this a contradiction? It is not. Consider two other 
programs: 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
law, see Christopher Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
163 (2000). 
114 Or unless there is a third-party effect. 
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C. Program C would eliminate a risk of 1/200,000, faced mostly by poor people, 
whose median WTP is $10. 
D. Program D would eliminate a risk of 1/200,000, faced mostly by wealthy people, 
whose median WTP is $50. 
 
Under plausible assumptions, program C and program D would produce identical 
welfare gains. In the abstract, there is no reason to think that wealthy people gain more 
than do poor people from the elimination of a statistical risk. But in light of the fact that 
they have little money, the payment of $10 is worse for poor people than for wealthy 
people; hence the welfare loss of paying $10 is higher for them. This point explains the 
difference in WTP. Program C might well give its beneficiaries the welfare equivalent of 
program D; but insofar as program C is taking money from those same beneficiaries, it is 
removing more welfare, on a dollar-per-dollar basis, than program D does. If the 
beneficiaries of program C are being asked to pay for it, government should not require 
them to pay more than their WTP. 
 
As a general rule, the same conclusion applies to WTP over the life-span. 
Government should not require younger people to “buy” more regulatory protection than 
they believe to be in their interests. Note here that such protection is, in a sense, a form of 
insurance. If younger people are not willing to pay much for such insurance, government 
ought not to compel them to do so unless there is some kind of informational or cognitive 
problem with their decisions. Now it is entirely possible that some such problem is at 
work. Young people might be acting as if low-probability events are worth no concern at 
all, or they might be engaged in a form of hyberbolic discounting for risks that will come 
to fruition in what seems to be the irrelevantly distant future.115 But unless a problem of 
this kind can be identified, WTP is the appropriate measure in cases in which regulation 
is a forced exchange.  
 
D. When the Beneficiaries of Regulation Do Not Pay Its Full Cost, and Regulation 
vs. Transfers 
 
But it is frequently the case that the beneficiaries of regulatory protection pay 
little or none of its cost.116 What should be done in that event117? Here the analysis is 
more complex. To see the problem, suppose that people who are under thirty would pay a 
median of $50 to eliminate a risk of 1/200,000, that the aggregate cost of eliminating that 
risk is $55, but that the beneficiaries would pay only $10 of that amount, with the 
remainder of the cost being borne by others (say, consumers and employees). This 
program is, by hypothesis, inefficient, because the monetized costs exceed the monetized 
benefits. But it might well be justified on grounds of overall welfare; to answer that 
question, we would need to measure the actual welfare effects of the program (to say the 
least, a difficult task). In terms of the welfare of the possible beneficiaries of the 
                                                 
115 See note supra. 
116 This is true for clean air act regulation. See, e.g., See Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air 
Act Regulation, 24 Regulation 34 (2001). 
117 For an extremely valuable discussion in the related area of employment law, see Christine Jolls, 
Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan L Rev 223 (2000). 
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regulation, the question is much easier. If they are paying only $10 for benefits valued at 
$50, they are net gainers. It follows that if social planners are particularly interested in the 
welfare of the possible beneficiaries, the program is justified.  
 
But there is an obvious response. To assist the relevant population, it would be 
better to give them a cash subsidy rather than to provide them with a regulatory benefit 
that is, by hypothesis, less valuable to them than it is costly to those who must provide it. 
And under plausible assumptions, a subsidy would indeed be better than a regulatory 
benefit, both because it is more efficient and because it is a better means of 
accomplishing the redistributive goal. In the face of background injustice, or indefensible 
inequality, the tax system should usually be used as a corrective.118 On a widely held 
view, regulation should involve maximization; redistributive tax and spending policies, 
rather than regulation, should be used to promote redistribution.119 The issue is 
disputed.120 But if a redistribution is not going to come from tax and spending policies, it 
is certainly possible that provision of the regulatory benefit is preferable to the status quo 
on grounds of both welfare and distribution. Note that a uniform VSL or VSLY is itself a 
kind of redistributive strategy (imperfect to be sure).121  
 
Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve the hard questions here. If the life-years 
approach ends up valuing younger people more than older people (because they have 
more life-years left), the older people have no claim for special government help. But we 
can reach some more general conclusions about WTP and regulatory policy. If the 
beneficiaries of regulation pay its full cost, and if there is no informational or cognitive 
problem, WTP provides the correct figure. If the beneficiaries of regulation do not pay its 
full cost, regulation might be justified even if it exceeds WTP. For purposes of policy, 
one problem is that in many cases, government cannot easily determine how much of the 
cost of regulation is borne by its purported beneficiaries. With perfect tools, regulators 
would have a complete sense of the incidence of regulatory costs, and an understanding 
of the distribution of benefits and burdens would be helpful in making regulatory 
choices.122 But government lacks those tools. The best approach is probably to begin with 
WTP to measure the value of statistical life-years, and then to make distributional 
                                                 
118 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. Chi L Rev 
439 (2003); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income 
Tax in Redistributing Income, 28 J Legal Stud 667 (1994); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. 
Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking, 71 Am Econ Rev. 414 (1981). 
119 See Weisbach, supra note; Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and 
Safety Regulation 8 (1996) 
120 See Chris Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 Cornell L Rev 1003, 1069 
(2001; Chris Sanchirico, Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J 
Legal Stud 797, 820 (2000). 
121 See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, in Cost-Benefit Analysis 7 (Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner eds. 
2001); see also Kahn, supra note. In the racial context, a uniform VSL can even be seen as a form of 
affirmative action, in the sense that it gives a “boost” to African-American VSL because of a perception of 
past social discrimination. Note that the boost also results in a reduction of white VSL, at least if regulators 
use the median VSL. 
122 Note that in its recent draft guidelines, OMB asks regulators to try to assess the distributional effects of 
regulation. See Office of Management and Budget, Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and 
Benefits of Federal Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 5521 (Feb. 3, 2003). 
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adjustments in appropriate cases.123 Along these dimensions, the analysis of statistical 
life-years does not differ from the analysis of statistical lives. 
 
 Of course government does not lack control over the distributional incidence of 
efforts to protect safety, health, and the environment. Government might provide a 
benefit for free, perhaps by accompanying regulation with a cash payment to those who 
are supposed to benefit. But an analysis of this possibility would take me well beyond the 
present discussion.124 For reasons I have given, older people, as such, are not a strong 
payment for cash subsidies, even if future studies find that their WTP is sometimes 
relatively low under a VSLY approach. 
 
E. Uniformity and Disaggregation in Monetary Valuation  
 
Government agencies tend to use a uniform VSL. Proposals for the use of VSLY 
tend to use a uniform number or a number that makes only simple, crude distinctions—
between, say, people under and over 65.125 But we can make some conceptual progress 
here, and eventually practical progress as well, if we recognize that if government had 
perfect information, and if it could individuate regulatory benefits, its valuations would 
be much more fine-grained. In fact the use of VSLY, as opposed to VSL, can be seen as 
an initial step toward more in the way of individuation. To put the point in the simplest 
terms: To the extent that the beneficiaries of regulation bear its full costs and have perfect 
information, a perfectly informed government might use a perfectly individuated WTP, 
giving people precisely the level of protection that they deem to be in their interests with 
respect to the risk in question.126 
 
It follows that a uniform VSL, or a uniform VSLY, is not easy to justify. It can be 
supported partly on the ground that government lacks the tools to bring about sufficient 
individuation across either people or risks. We have seen that government does not know 
how VSLY varies across the life cycle. With their various endowments and preferences, 
individuals show a great deal of heterogeneity with respect to statistical hazards. We have 
seen that wealthy people will pay more than poor people; risk-averse people will of 
course pay more than risk-inclined people In addition, social risks, even risks of death, 
are hardly all the same. Many people are risk-averse with respect to some hazards but 
risk-inclined with respect to others. In deciding whether to be risk-averse, numerous 
distinctions might be deemed relevant. People might reasonably distinguish, for example, 
between a risk of death from cancer and a risk of death from heart disease, and they 
might also distinguish among workplace risks, risks of motor vehicle accidents, and risks 
associated with air pollution.127 If government were omniscient, it would individuate 
regulatory programs along all these dimensions. And if regulatory tools could be 
perfectly individuated, government might provide every individual with regulatory 
protection that perfectly matched his preferences and hence his situation-specific WTP—
                                                 
123 See Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason (2002). 
124 For some remarks, see Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note. 
125 See note supra. 
126 I am assuming that WTP is based on informed preferences and that there are no third party effects. 
127 See relevant discussion, see Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (2001). 
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assuming, again, that people are being forced to pay the cost of that protection.128 There 
would be no single VSL or VSLY; the relevant values would be highly particular to 
persons and situations. 
 
Why, then, does government rely on such crude population-wide, largely risk-
invariant129 measures? One reason is that it lacks good information about the WTP of 
subgroups; another reason is that for many regulatory programs, it must simultaneously 
protect large populations. In these circumstances, a decision to adopt subgroup-specific 
WTP would be hard to defend unless the program in question would benefit and burden 
mostly or entirely classes of people who could be defined in terms of those subgroup 
characteristics. As knowledge grows, it might be expected that less uniform numbers will 
be used in the future.130 I cannot discuss that issue in any detail here, but the shift from 
VSL to VSLY can be seen as a small but unmistakable movement in that direction. 
 
IV. Policy Implications 
 
 I have suggested that on grounds of welfare and equity, it makes a great deal of 
sense to focus on statistical life-years rather than statistical lives. At a minimum, 
regulators should have, and give, a sense of the life-years expected to be saved by 
regulation. The hard question involves the translation of life-years into monetary 
equivalents. The basic claim of WTP is that it provides a (crude but administrable) proxy 
for the welfare effects of various courses of action. Other things being equal, more life-
years provide more welfare than fewer, whatever the results of WTP studies. But if young 
people show a low VSLY, and if old people show a high one, government does people no 
favors by using a uniform number if they are well-informed and if they bear the cost of 
the benefits that are being provided. Because VSLY might vary over the lifespan, there is 
a risk that a uniform VSLY will produce significant errors—possibly, in fact, more 
serious errors than a uniform VSL.131 Ideally, a government that uses WTP, and seeks 
accuracy, would inquire into WTP over lifespans and use varying VSLY depending on 
the ages of the beneficiaries of regulation. Lacking that information, government might 
do best to proceed more modestly and cautiously.  
 
 We could imagine a range of possibilities. At a minimum, a focus on life-years 
allows alternatives to be ranked in terms of cost-effectiveness: A program that saves 
10,000 life-years is better than one that saves 4000, and more resources should be 
devoted to the former than to the latter. With respect to CBA, the most modest approach 
would be purely informational: to calculate both VSL and VSLY (using the most 
                                                 
128 As noted, subsidies might be appropriate in cases in which people’s WTP is low because of (say) 
poverty despite the possibility of large gains from regulation. 
129 But see the sensitivity analysis in the context of arsenic, giving a premium because of the dread and 
involuntary nature of the cancer, discussed in Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note. 
130 Id. 
131 The reason is that if a uniform VSLY leads to far too low numbers for some people, and far too high 
numbers for others, the multiplication of life-years by the monetary value might produce less accuracy than 
would reliance on a simple, single VSL. Suppose, for example, that the government is choosing between a 
VSL of $6.1 million and a VSLY of $200,000. If young people show a VSLY of $60,000, and if old people 
show a VSLY of $350,000, it is possible that VSL will actually provide a better match to actual WTP.  
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accurate available measure) and to inform the public of the calculations. A mildly less 
modest approach would be to continue with VSL, but in close cases, to treat VSLY, or 
the age distribution of the protected population, as a kind of tie-breaker. When CBA 
produces difficult calls, agencies might be told not to act if the benefited class is mostly 
elderly, but to do so if the benefited class is mostly young. On this view, the age 
distribution would be consulted only if the case were otherwise in equipoise.  
 
The most ambitious approach would be to abandon VSL and to use VSLY 
instead, at least if reasonably accurate numbers are available. On this view, VSL would 
be seen as a crude first step toward the more refined inquiry than VSLY makes possible. 
A number of intermediate approaches are possible. Perhaps VSL would be the basic 
foundation for analysis, but a sensitivity analysis would run the numbers with VSLY. 
Perhaps regulators would have the authority, subject to political constraints, to use one or 
another number when the circumstances make that decision seem reasonable.132 Of 
course any effort to engage in analysis of costs and benefits would be constrained in the 
usual fashion, with, for example, permission to consider distributional considerations, 




 The discussion thus far has been narrowly focussed on the choice between 
statistical lives and statistical life-years. But an exploration of the relevant issues has 
some broader implications. I explore three questions here: the possible opposition 
between the use of surveys to resolve hard normative questions; the choice between 
QALYs and WTP in regulatory policy; and the possible opposition between welfare and 
WTP. 
 
A. A Tempting Wrong Question 
 
It might be tempting to argue that the choice between statistical lives and VSL or 
statistical life-years and VSLY should be made not by asking people about their WTP, 
but by asking them their preferences as between programs that focus on VSL or 
VSLY.134 People might be asked if they believe that government should treat each 
averted fatality as no more and no less than one, or if government should instead consider 
the age of those whose lives are saved. If it turns out that people prefer life-years, then we 
                                                 
132 One implication of the present discussion involves the possibility of legal challenges to the decision to 
use either VSL or VSLY, and also to particular decisions about how to measure them. Under some statutes, 
cost-benefit analysis is the basis for decision, and in such cases, the agency’s calculations are subject to 
challenge. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). In light of the present 
state of uncertainty, it would not be arbitrary for an agency to choose either VSL or VSLY, though there 
are plausible challenges to both measures. See Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note, for relevant 
discussion. 
133 See Robert Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, Broader and Deeper Cost-Benefit Analysis?, U Pa L Rev 
(2002). Note that OMB suggests attention to distributional considerations in its draft guidelines. See Office 
of Management and Budget, Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 5521 (Feb. 3, 2003). 
134 For a related survey, see McKie et al., supra note, at 117-127. 
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might select appropriate numbers by asking subjects to choose between programs with 
different amounts for VSLY, or by seeing, through surveys, how people value life-years 
over the course of a lifespan. It might turn out, for example, that people consider each 
life-year as equivalent to (say) $200,000; or perhaps people will value life-years at a 
special premium when the beneficiaries are either especially old or especially young. 
Perhaps people do not believe that every life-year counts as equivalent to every other, but 
would prefer to devote special attention to the life-years of those at identifiable points at 
the age distribution. In any case, the suggestion would be that policy should be set by 
consulting not WTP, but instead the public’s judgments about the appropriate values. 
 
This solution has some intuitive appeal; it seems responsive, as a democracy 
should be, to citizens’ judgments. Hence this solution has been used as a way of getting 
some purchase on the normative issues.135 If WTP in the market seems to have 
distortions, surveys might seem better, perhaps because they invite people to consult their 
conscience, not simply their self-interest. But this approach has two fundamental 
problems. The first is that people’s answers are highly likely to depend on how the 
questions are set up. The second is that even if people do have stable answers to such 
questions, it is unclear that those answers have any moral standing for purposes of policy 
and law. The problems with surveys, in this context, suggest that surveys are not 
likelihood to be a helpful way to solve many normative issues of this kind. 
 
1. An analogy. Consider the analogous question of obligations to future 
generations,136 a much-disputed problem in regulatory policy.137 A regulatory system that 
attempts to track people’s preferences would try to measure intergenerational time 
preferences, that is, to elicit people’s judgments about how to trade off the protection of 
current lives and future lives. Hence an important question, asked in many debates about 
the issue, is whether people actually make such judgments and whether they can be 
elicited. And indeed, an influential set of studies finds that people value the lives of those 
in the current generation far more than the lives of those in future generations.138 From a 
series of surveys, Maureen Cropper and her coauthors suggest that people are indifferent 
between savings one life today and saving 45 lives in 100 years.139 They make this 
suggestion on the basis of questions asking people whether they would choose a program 
that saves “100 lives now” or a program that saves a substantially larger number “100 
years from now.”140  
 
                                                 
135 See id. 
136 See Shane Frederick, Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference: Are Future Lives Valued Less?, 26 
J. Risk and Uncertainty 1 (2003). 
137 Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human 
Lives, 99 Col L Rev 941 (1999); Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 65 U Chi L Rev 1333 (1998). 
138 See Maureen Cropper et al., Rates of Time Preference for Saving Lives, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 469 (1992); 
Maureen Cropper et al., Preferences for Life Saving Programs: How the Public Discounts Time and Age, 8 




But it turns out that other descriptions of the same problem yield significantly 
different results.141 Here, as in other contexts, it is unclear whether people actually have 
well-formed preferences with which the legal system can work.142 For example, most 
people consider “equally bad” a single death from pollution next year and a single death 
from pollution in 100 years143—implying no preference for members of the current 
generation. In another finding of no strong preference for the current generation, people 
are equally divided between two programs: one that will save 55 lives now and 105 more 
lives in twenty years; and one that will save 100 lives now and 50 lives 25 years from 
now.144 It is even possible to frame the question in such a way as to find that future lives 
are valued more, not less, highly than current lives.145 The most sensible conclusion is 
that people do not have robust, well-ordered intergenerational time preferences.146 If so, it 
is not possible for government to track those preferences, because they are an artifact of 
how the question is put. 
 
The issue of statistical lives or VSL vs. statistical life-years or VSLY is similar on 
this count. It should be easy to construct questions that would yield a preference for VSL: 
 
Government is considering a policy that would count the value of elderly people 
as significantly less than the value of younger people. According to one proposal, for 
every dollar that most people are worth, people over 70 are worth 53 cents. Do you 
approve of this proposal? 
 
We can safely predict that most respondents would answer “No.” But it should 
also be easy to construct questions that would suggest public disapproval of a uniform 
VS:  
 
Would you favor (a) a program that would save one hundred children from dying 
of a fatal cancer at the age of ten or instead (b) a program that would save one hundred 
and one senior citizens from dying of a fatal cancer at the age of eighty? 
 
We can safely predict that most people would favor (a). In fact I have conducted a 
small survey myself, asking University of Chicago law students whether they would 
favor a policy that saves twenty people with a median age of forty or one that saves thirty 
people with a median age of sixty-five. By a majority of about two-to-one (fifty-three to 
twenty-five), the former policy was favored. But as in the context of harms to future 
                                                 
141 Frederick, supra note. 
142 The point is stressed in Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Is Libertarian Paternalism An 
Oxymoron?, U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 2003). 
143 Frederick, supra note, at 43.  
144 Id. at 44. 
145 Id. at 45. Frederick asked subjects to choose between two programs. The first would become more 
effective over time, saving 100 lives this decade, 200 lives in the following decade, and 300 lives in the 
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(forthcoming 2003). 
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generations, highly variable responses should be expected in accordance with the nature 
of the question. It is doubtful that people have stable, well-considered judgments on the 
issue. 
 
2. Why the question is wrong. The more fundamental problem is that people’s 
judgments on survey questions of this sort should not be determinative for purposes of 
policy or law. Suppose, for example, that a relevant population concluded that it would 
prefer to save one hundred white lives to one hundred African-American lives—or that it 
would prefer to abandon cost-benefit analysis altogether, finding both VSL and VSLY 
morally unacceptable. What kind of standing would those judgments have? Or suppose 
that existing generations concluded that a current life is worth fifty lives in 2080. Why 
would that conclusion count for purposes of policy? What matters is not the fact of those 
judgments, but their legitimacy and their sense. If we care about WTP, it is only because 
WTP is a proxy for welfare, and because welfare deserves (some) moral standing as such. 
But eliciting people’s judgments, on future generations or VSL vs. VSLY, has no such 
justification.  
 
To be sure, those judgments deserve consideration and respect if they are 
reflective. And it is always possible to ask: Who will assess the legitimacy and sense of 
citizens’ judgments? This is a reasonable question, and it is certainly possible to doubt 
the legitimacy and sense of the assessor. But ours is a deliberative democracy, one that 
does not make policy on the basis of opinion polls or snapshots of people’s opinions.147 
Difficult normative questions of this kind might be informed by surveys, but they cannot 
be answered by them. 
 
B. A Brief Note on QALYs 
 
If focussing on life-years is appropriate, then it might be tempting to suggest that 
officials should be concerned with quality-adjusted life-years, or QALYs. The central 
idea behind QALYs is that regulators should be concerned with maximizing the 
aggregate health of the community.148 To calculate QALYs, regulators come up with a 
scale that ranges from zero, for death, to one, for perfect health. Adverse health effects 
are ranked in terms of severity, with serious harms (say, a devastating but nonfatal heart 
attack) ranked lower than less serious ones (say, low-level respiratory problems). Some 
government agencies have attempted to assess regulations by calculating the QALYs that 
they save.149 From the public health perspective, it is easy to see the appeal of QALYs. If 
a choice must be made, a doctor might reasonably decide, for example, that she will 
perform a difficult operation on someone who is thirty rather than someone who is 
eighty. And if the public health community has to allocate scarce resources, an inquiry 
into QALYs seems like a sensible place to start. 
 
If government should calculate VSLY, should it also calculate the value of 
QALYs, and then VQALYs, and proceed accordingly? I cannot answer that complex 
                                                 
147 See William Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (1996). 
148 See Adam Wagstaff, QALYs and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off, 10 J Health Econ 21 (1991). 
149 See Appendix. 
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question here. But we can see that any response must come to terms with questions of 
both welfare and equity. At first glance, an effort to increase the number of QALYs has 
many advantages in terms of welfare; in fact it seems directly connected to the welfare 
goal. But in some contexts, the use of QALYs would raise serious questions of equity. 
Suppose, for example, that regulators are considering two kinds of interventions, 
Intervention A and Intervention B, designed to assist two different groups of people. The 
first group consists of people with extremely serious disabilities; Intervention A would 
increase their QALYs. But it would do so only by creating a relatively small increase in 
their well-being, raising them from extremely serious to merely serious levels of 
disability. The second group consists of people with moderate levels of disability, and 
Intervention B would raise them to slight levels of disability, in a way that would result in 
significantly more QALYs than Intervention A. If QALYs are our guide, Intervention B 
is clearly preferable, and indeed it is plausible to think that Intervention B would result in 
a larger welfare gain than Intervention A. 
 
Is Intervention B to be preferred? This is by no means obvious, and for two 
different reasons. First, QALYs might not be adequately measuring welfare gains in this 
context. In the abstract, it is possible that the welfare gains from Intervention A are 
actually higher even if it produces fewer increases in QALYs. Second, Intervention A is 
assisting those who are most severely disadvantaged, and people in that category have a 
claim on social attention even if helping them produces fewer QALYs than imaginable 
alternatives.150 Those with especially severe preexisting conditions might deserve higher 
priority on equitable grounds, whatever the QALY calculus might show. Here as 
elsewhere, the pursuit of welfare, through regulation, should be undertaken in a way that 
gives distributional weights to those who are least well-off. In this way, the larger 
philosophical debates about utilitarianism and its limits find analogies in current and 
coming debates about regulatory policy. 
 
I do not mean to suggest that these are fundamental objections to the use of 
QALYs. The problem of severe preexisting conditions does not often arise in the context 
of regulation; it is more likely to occur in the context of medical interventions, where 
QALYs have raised special concerns. There are also hard questions about how to 
monetize QALYs, even if we decide that we should focus on them. Is the WTP approach 
appropriate here? Should VQALYs be calculated by multiplying each QALY by the 
beneficiaries’ WTP for them? We could easily imagine a population (one of wealthy 
senior citizens, for example) that would show a high WTP for a few QALYs. We could 
also imagine a population (one of poor teenagers, for example) that would show a low 
WTP for a large number of QALYs. At first glance, QALYs are a far better measure of 
welfare gains than WTP in such situations.  
 
But recall once again the particular problems created by forced exchanges: If 
those who obtain a large number of QALYs are not willing to pay for them, government 
does them no favors by mandating the purchase. In a case in which people are not willing 
to pay much for a large number of QALYs, government should probably do a great deal 
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of subsidizing. My (tentative) analysis of the uses of WTP in the context of statistical 
lives applies, in its essential form, to the context of QALYs—suggesting that here as 
elsewhere, WTP is a sensible place to begin, but that there are extremely difficult and 
unresolved normative and empirical questions here. 
 
C. Welfare vs. WTP 
 
I have suggested that WTP is a plausible starting-place for policy judgments about 
how to monetize statistical life-years. But I have also indicated that in the face of a 
problem of information or cognition, the argument for relying on WTP is greatly 
weakened. It will be useful to explore that possibility. 
 
The most obvious cases are simple: People lack information about the risks that 
they face, and hence they show a small WTP to avoid a risk that is statistically large. Or 
people might have an inflated sense of the likely risk, and show a high WTP to avoid a 
risk that is miniscule.151 A growing body of literature shows a separate point: At the time 
of decision, people often mispredict the welfare effects of one or another option.152 For 
example, assistant professors often exaggerate the effects of a denial of tenure on their 
well-being a year after the decision.153 In general, people overestimate the adverse 
consequences of setbacks, to which they are frequently able to adapt.154 In the context of 
environmental and social changes, an empirical study shows pervasive exaggerations of 
likely consequences for quality of life.155 It follows that in some contexts, WTP will 
mispredict the lived consequences of choices. “The evidence of grave deficiencies in 
taste predictions appears to pose a significant challenge to many applications of the 
rational-agent model.”156 Some of these deficiencies stem from a failure to appreciate the 
possibility of adaptation to change; some of them are a product of an exaggerated sense 
of the effect any single factor on well-being.157 What I am adding here is that WTP will 
be a poor proxy for welfare in cases in which we have good reason to suppose that 
underestimation or overestimation are likely. Of course government officials should be 
reluctant to second-guess citizens, but in some cases, the second-guessing is well-
justified. 
 
Consider an example: A reliable contingent valuation study shows that people are 
willing to pay far more to prevent a long cancer death than to prevent a sudden 
unanticipated death, with death from heart disease falling somewhere in the middle.158 As 
it happens, the median WTP for a sudden unanticipated death is half the median WTP for 
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a cancer death.159 Must these numbers be decisive for purposes of policy, assuming that 
the contingent valuation study is reliable160? I suggest that they should not be if we have 
reason to believe that the WTP figures are not accurately measuring welfare. And is it 
even plausible to think that the “cancer premium” is so high that it actually doubles the 
cost of death? Is it reasonable to think that a death from cancer is actually twice as bad as 
a death that is sudden and unanticipated? To be sure, a degree of pain and suffering 
typically accompanies cancer, but it is not easy to defend the set of (exotic) values that 
would lead to the conclusion that the relevant pain and suffering is as bad as death 
itself.161 I believe that WTP is not measuring welfare here, and that the inflated numbers 
for cancer deaths is a product of an intuitive recoil at the idea of cancer, one that leads to 
unrealistically high monetary values.  
 
Perhaps this example can be disputed. If so, consider the fact that according to 
some studies of WTP, a curable cancer is valued at $2.3 million, more than a third the 
value of a statistical life.162 Suppose that these studies are reliable and that $2.3 million 
really does capture people’s WTP for a curable cancer.163 Is it plausible to think that the 
welfare loss from a curable cancer is more than a third of the welfare loss from death? 
More likely, the frightening idea of “cancer” is driving people’s judgments, in a way that 
leads to a WTP that does not accurately measure the welfare loss from a curable cancer. 
This is an example of a situation in which “decision utility” (anticipated utility at the time 
of decision) does not match “experience utility” (the actual utility of lived experience).164 
There are many other illustrations, as, for example, when people show a high WTP to 
avoid an injury that is not so terrible in actual experience.165 In short, WTP is sometimes 
a poor proxy for welfare. Because that issue does not directly bear on the choice between 
VSL and VSLY, I will not discuss it in detail here. But I do suggest that the point holds 
out a warning for the use of WTP studies to assess statistical risks, especially in the 
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In this essay, I have suggested that government should focus its attention on 
statistical life-years, not statistical lives. No regulatory program makes people immortal. 
The only issue is life extension, and here the length of the extension surely matters. In 
terms of welfare, a program that saves 10,000 life-years is better than one that saves 
1,000 life years, holding all else constant. Behind a veil of ignorance, reasonable people 
would undoubtedly prefer a program that eliminates a 1/500,000 risk faced at thirty to a 
program that eliminates the same risk faced at sixty. In welfare terms, a program that 
saves younger people is unquestionably better than one that saves older people, holding 
all else constant.  
 
To be sure, there are ethical constraints on the promotion of welfare through 
regulatory policy. But as a general rule, there is no injustice in taking account of the 
difference between the anticipated welfare gain of a program that saves older people and 
the anticipated welfare gain of a program that saves younger people. Older people were 
once younger, and if all goes well younger people will become older. In any case a focus 
on statistical life-years has an important kind of neutrality: It treats everyone’s life-years 
the same. I have also suggested that the claims that underlie the prohibition on age 
discrimination do not raise serious moral questions about focussing on life-years. These 
points suggest that in terms of welfare and equity, it is better to attend to statistical life-
years than to statistical lives. If either approach discriminates, it is one that relies only on 
statistical lives, because that approach treats the life-years of older people as worth more 
than the life-years of younger people. 
 
But a choice in favor of life-years leaves open questions of monetary valuation. 
These questions are both normative and empirical in nature. The usual debates about 
WTP reappear in this context. In any case, we do not have good information about how 
WTP changes over the life cycle. Older people may or may not be willing to pay less to 
reduce risks than younger people. Even if older people are willing to pay more to save 
each remaining statistical life-year, it is likely that older people are willing to pay less 
than younger people, in the aggregate, to save the number of life-years that remain.166 
Without resolving the WTP debate, I have suggested several ways that regulators might 
incorporate information about life-years in regulatory decisions. At a minimum, I have 
urged that information on life-years should be compiled, and that it should be made 
relevant to judgments that are otherwise close or difficult. In this way, regulatory policy 
would be shifted toward somewhat greater concern for the risks faced by children, and 
somewhat reduced concern for the risks faced by those who are elderly—thus making it 
more likely that more people would have a chance to become elderly. 
 
 If the analysis here is correct, it has two more general implications. The first is 
that WTP is a pragmatic tool and no more. Some economists seem to identify WTP with 
welfare itself—an absurd claim that, if taken seriously, would produce both blunders and 
injustices. As we have seen, people’s WTP is sometimes poorly predictive of the welfare 
                                                 
166 See Viscusi and Aldy, supra note, at 50-53. 
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effects of one or another option167—a point with general and underexplored implications 
for regulatory policy. The second involves constraints on the promotion of welfare. While 
welfare is indeed the basic goal of much regulation, there are constraints on the pursuit of 
that goal, and these constraints should be specified. Any attempt at specification will be 
controversial. I have suggested, for example, that when people have had bad luck in the 
natural lottery, government cannot legitimately use the life-years criterion to 
disadvantage them further. But however the hardest controversies are resolved, I suggest 
that the constraints do not apply to most regulatory decisions that focus on statistical life-
years. Regulators should calculate expected savings in those terms and give the result 
serious consideration at the point of decision. 
                                                 
167 For a great deal of relevant discussion, see Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 





Regulatory Impact Statements Using Life-Years or Quality-Adjusted Life Years 
 
FDA final seafood HACCP rule (1995). US Food and Drug Administration: Procedures 
for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Products; Final 
Rule. 60 FR 65095, December 18, 1995. Used monetized QALYs in a primary benefit-
cost analysis; QALYs described accurately. 
 
FDA final anti-smoking rule (1996). US Food and Drug Administration, “Regulations 
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect 
Children and Adolescents; Final Rule,” 61 FR 44395, August 28, 1996. Used QALYs in 
a primary benefit-cost analysis. 
 
EPA final ozone and particulate standards for outdoor air quality (1997). ADD citation. 
Used life years but not QALYs in a sensitivity analysis of benefit-cost analysis. 
 
FDA final mammography rule (1997). US Food and Drug Administration: “Quality 
Mammography Standards; Final Rule.” 62 FR 55851, October 28, 1997. Used a 5-year 
survival rate approach when measuring benefits, but monetized only lives saved, using 
the value of a statistical life of $5 million. 
 
HRSA organ donor final rule (1998). Health Resources and Services Administration: 
“Procurement and Transplantation Network; Final Rule.” 63 FR 16295, April 2, 1998. 
Used statistical life years valued at $116,000 per year, but did not use QALYs. 
 
FDA final juice labeling rule (1998). Food and Drug Administration: “Food Labeling: 
Warning and Notice Statement: Labeling of Juice Products; Final Rule.” 63 FR 37029, 
July 8, 1998. Used monetized QALYs in a primary benefit-cost analysis; QALYs 
described accurately.  
 
FDA proposed consumer trans-fat labeling rule (1999). US Food and Drug 
Administration: “Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient 
Content Claims, and Health Claims; Proposed Rule.” 64 FR 62746, November 17, 1999. 
Used monetized QALYs in a primary benefit-cost analysis; QALYs described accurately. 
 
FDA final shell egg safety rule (2000). US Food and Drug Administration: “Food 
Labeling, Safe Handling Statements, Labeling of Shell Eggs; Refrigeration of Shell Eggs 
Held for Retail Distribution; Final Rule.” 65 FR 76091, December 5, 2000. Used 
monetized QALYs in a primary benefit-cost analysis; QALYs described accurately. 
 
EPA Tier 2 Rule (date?). 
 
FDA final juice HACCP rule (2001). Food and Drug Administration: “Hazard Analysis 
and Critical Control Point (HAACP); Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing 
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and Importing of Juice; Final Rule.” 66 FR 6137, January 19, 2001. Used monetized 
QALYs in a primary benefit-cost analysis; QALYs described accurately. 
CMS immunization standards final rule with comment (2002). Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, “Conditions of Participation: Immunization Standards for Hospitals, 
Long-Term Care Facilities, and Home Health Agencies.” 67 FR 61808, October 2, 2002. 
Used $50,000-$100,000 cost per year of healthy life saved to monetize benefits, 
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